Conspiracy- Organizers of Male Correspondence Club Convicted of Conspiracy to Mail Obscenity by Editors,
1964]
CASE COMMENTS
CONSPIRACY-ORGAizERs OF MATE CORRESPONDENCE CLUB
CONVICTED OF OoNsPiRAcy To MAIL OBSCENITY
Defendants, husband and wife, organized a male correspondence club
which was eventually joined by 650 members. The club was advertised
in two body building magazines, edited by the husband, which obviously
appealed to the homosexual male.' The advertisements invited individuals
to join the club and "exchange body building photographs-relate interest-
ing, personal experiences, get true enjoyment from swapping fascinating
stories with males of unusual occupations and avocational pursuits." 2 The
indictment 3 charged that defendants conspired 4 with certain club members
to use the mails knowingly for the transmission of obscene matter.5 The
prosecution conceded that the organization of a pen pal club for homo-
sexuals was not per se illegal; 0O nor was there any evidence that defendants
sent, received, or observed any obscene material.7 However, defendants
1 The Government did not contend that the magazines were obscene. Brief for
Appellee, p. 24. The court emphasized the magazines were protected in their homo-
sexual content by Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1960) ; One, Inc. v.
Olesen, 355 U.S. 371 (1958) (per curiam); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476
(1957). Instant case at 875-76.
2 Instant case at 876.
3The indictment charged defendants and thirty-seven club members, of which
twenty-nine were convicted on pleas of guilty or nolo contendere. Of the remaining
defendants, one died before trial, two were found not guilty and five, including appel-
lants, were found guilty in a nonjury trial, and two were found guilty in a jury trial
held simultaneously. Forty-two other club members were named in the indictment
as nondefendant coconspirators. Instant case at 874-75.
4 The alleged conspiracy seems closer to a "wheel" conspiracy than to a "chain"
conspiracy, with the club members (the spokes) interconnected through the defend-
ants (the hub). Compare Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946), with
United States v. Bruno, 105 F.2d 921 (2d Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 308 U.S.
287 (1939), and Jezewski v. United States, 13 F.2d 599 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 273
U.S. 735 (1926). However, unlike other "wheel" conspiracies, the illegal activity
revolved around the hub, rather than through the hub.
5 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 1461 (1958).
6 Brief for Appellee, p. 30. "[The Government] must make this admission be-
cause there is no law placing homosexuals in a legal status different from that of
heterosexuals. . . . [The conviction] renders nugatory the Constitutionally protected
right of even homosexuals to associate through correspondence or otherwise." Instant
case at 882-83 (dissenting opinion).
7 Instant case at 878.
Emphasizing the first amendment guarantee of free speech, the Supreme Court
has narrowly construed obscene material under 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1958). "Ob-
scenity . . . requires proof of two distinct elements: (1) patent offensiveness; and
(2) 'prurient interest' appeal." Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 486
(1962) (opinion of Harlan, J.). Under this standard, the Court has held as not
obscene a body building magazine described by the Government as consisting of
many "photographs . . . of nude male models, usually posed with some object in
front of their genitals." Id. at 490 n.13.
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admitted the obscenity of some letters introduced at the trial which forty-
five members wrote directly to each other.8  The Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit affirmed defendants' conviction. To support the finding
that defendants knew that the club was being used for obscene corre-
spondence, the court relied heavily on communications that defendants
received from club members: thirteen of the requests for membership,
accepted by the defendants, contained unsolicited measurements of the
applicants' genitals; ,the defendants received one letter indicating an interest
in nude males, another expressing a desire to live with a male "who cares
not for women," and a third indicating satisfaction that pen pals were
"hot uninhibited studs like myself"; 9 defendants also suggested to one
inquiring member that he use a Polaroid delayed action camera to take
photographs of himself.10 Significantly, none of these communications to
the defendants was itself obscene."' United States v. Zuideveld, 316 F.2d
873 (7th Cir. 1963), petition for cert. filed, Misc. No. 468, U.S., Aug.
6, 1963.
A federal conspiracy conviction requires proof that two or more
persons agreed to commit a federal offense.'2 An alleged conspirator must
have knowledge of the substantive offense that is the object of the con-
spiracy in order to have the requisite intent attributed to him.13 Since
evidence of activity not itself illegal fails to separate the unwitting accom-
plice from the guilty coconspirator if the accused has neither committed
nor planned the substantive offense,14 proof of intent must be based on
8 Instant case at 877.
9 Instant case at 879. Appellants testified they thought they were "smart aleck"
or "nut" remarks and ignored them. Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 Defendants, as indigents, requested the court to subpoena 420 club members
pursuant to FED. R. CRIm. P. 17(b), which provides for subpoena of material wit-
nesses at government expense for indigent defendants. Defendants urged that these
members would testify that they had not joined the club for the purpose of mailing
obscene material. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court's refusal to sub-
poena any witnesses was not an abuse of discretion. Compare Goldsby v. United
States, 160 U.S. 70, 73 (1895) ; Reistroffer v. United States, 258 F.2d 379, 396 (8th
Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 927 (1959). While the right to subpoena witnesses
is guaranteed a defendant by the sixth amendment, the right to do so at government
expense is wholly statutory. See Feguer v. United States, 302 F.2d 214, 241 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 872 (1962). Compare Crumpton v. United States, 138
U.S. 361 (1891). A request for a more limited number of members would seem
reasonable and necessary to produce a fair trial. Since the sixth amendment guaran-
tees the right to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in the same terms as it
guarantees the right to assistance of counsel, decisions concerning the latter right
may imply a similar constitutional obligation on the part of the Government to
subpoena at least a reasonable number of witnesses for indigent defendants. Compare
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) ; Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
See also Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
1
2 Ingram v. United States, 360 U.S. 672, 677-78 (1959); Pereira v. United
States, 347 U.S. 1, 12 (1954); American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S.
781, 810 (1946).
'3 Ingram v. United States, supra note 12, at 678.
'4 Cf. Ingram v. United States, supra note 12, at 677-78; Direct Sales Co. v.
United States, 319 U.S. 703, 711 (1943) ; Stanley v. United States, 245 F.2d 427, 430
(6th Cir. 1957). But see Phelps v. United States, 160 F.2d 858, 867-68 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 334 U.S. 860 (1947) ; Galatas v. United States, 80 F.2d 15, 24 (8th Cir.
1935), cert. denied, 297 U.S. 711 (1936).
CASE COMMENTS
unequivocal evidence of "knowledge that another purposes unlawful
action."'15 Proof of acquiescence in or indifference to the illegal activity
is not sufficient,16 nor is a showing of failure to "forego a normally lawful
activity, of the fruits of which he knows that others will make an unlawful
use." 1. Moreover, federal conspiracy requires at least that degree of
criminal intent which would be necessary for a conviction of the sub-
stantive offense,' 8 in this case violation of the mail obscenity statute, which
punishes only those who "knowingly" mail prohibited matter.
The court's reliance on the letters received by defendants from -club
members indicates that it affirmed the conviction on the theory that the
defendants' guilt consisted not in instigating a conspiracy, 19 but in having
a common design with the guilty club members to engage in the illegal
activity 20 begun after the formation of -the club.21 Under this theory, the
5 Direct Sales Co. v. United States, supra note 14, at 711; see Dennis v.
United States, 302 F.2d 5, 12 (10th Cir. 1962). Full knowledge of all the details
of the conspiracy or of the participation of others is not necessary. Blumenthal v.
United States, 332 U.S. 539, 557 (1947) ; Isaacs v. United States, 301 F.2d 706, 729
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 818 (1962). And all conspirators need not be ac-
quainted with each other, or have originally conceived or participated in the scheme.
United States v. Lester, 282 F.2d 750 (3d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 937
(1961).
16The lower courts frequently state that proof of acts done with knowledge that
they further the conspiracy is sufficient for conviction. However, the facts of these
cases show additional facts which would seem to sustain an inference that the accused
participated in the scheme as something which he desired to bring about and to
succeed. E.g., United States v. Tramaglino, 197 F.2d 928 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344
U.S. 864 (1952) (concealment of sale by failure to keep necessary records); cf.
Bacon v. United States, 127 F2d 985 (10th Cir. 1942) (secretive acts inconsistent
with lawful activity). See also Huff v. United States, 301 F.2d 760 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 922 (1962) ; Smith v. United States, 145 F.2d 643 (10th Cir. 1944),
cert. denied, 323 U.S. 803 (1945) ; United States v. Harrison, 121 F.2d 930 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 314 U.S. 661 (1941). See generally Developments in the Law--Crminal
Conspiracy, 72 HARv. L. REv. 920, 931 (1959); Note, Falcone Revisited: The Crimi-
nality of Sales to an Illegal Enterprise, 53 CoLuM. L. REv. 228, 234-37 (1953).
17United States v. Falcone, 109 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir.), aff'd, 311 U.S. 205
(1940). The Second Circuit has required a "stake in the venture." Ibid. The
Supreme Court has stated that "even if .. . [the "stake" test] may not be essential,
it is not irrelevant to the question of conspiracy." Direct Sales Co. v. United States,
319 U.S. 703, 713 (1943). See also Developments in the Law-Criminal Conspiracy,
72 IAv. L. REv. 920, 930-33 (1959).
'8E.g., Ingram v. United States, 360 U.S. 672, 678 (1959); Isaacs v. United
States, 301 F.2d 706, 729 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 818 (1962); United
States v. Ausmeier, 152 F.2d 349, 356 (2d Cir. 1945).
19 The prosecution urged that the defendants instigated the conspiracy by forming
the club with the intent to promote the transmission of obscenity. It asserted that
the advertisement and its setting sustained the inference that defendants intended
that club members exchange obscene materials through the mail, although the ad-
vertisement taken by itself or in another type of magazine would be "innocent."
Instant case at 882 (dissenting opinion). However, if the defendants were not the
instigators of the conspiracy and did not intend that obscenity be transmitted when
they formed the club, as the Seventh Circuit apparently concluded, there is a risk
that the advertisements were improperly used to help sustain the inference of con-
spiratorial intent formed after the organization of the club.
20 Cf. United States v. Falcone, 311 U.S. 205 (1940); Bartoli v. United States,
192 F.2d 130 (4th Cir. 1951). Compare Bacon v. United States, 127 F.2d 985 (10th
Cir. 1942) ; United States v. Koch, 113 F.2d 982 (2d Cir. 1940).
21 See Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 703 (1943) ; United States v.
Rappaport, 292 F.2d 261, 263-64 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 827 (1961).
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defendants' continuance of club activities after they knew, or had reason
to know,2 2 of the illegal activity of a part of the club membership, made
them coconspirators. 23  Yet, the evidence against the defendants on this
point was at best equivocal. It only indicated that the defendants sought
to earn money by arranging for correspondence among people defendants
knew to be homosexuals. But if an accused has neither planned nor
committed a substantive offense, proof of intent requires more than
knowledge that others might use his activity for illegal ends.2 4 No eco-
nomic reason was shown for the defendants to have promoted the exchange
of obscenity as opposed to constitutionally protected letters between homo-
sexuals. All the Government proved in the present case is that the club
became a means through which illegal activity was accomplished by a
portion of the membership.
The absence of convincing proof that defendants had knowledge of
the substantive illegal activity also raises a constitutional question, because
for a conviction under an obscenity statute, the first amendment apparently
requires proof that the defendants had knowledge of the obscene nature
of the correspondence. Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day 2 5 was a prosecu-
tion of a defendant, who also published body building magazines, for
printing and mailing a magazine containing an advertisement which offered
obscenity for sale.2 6  Mr. Justice Harlan, who announced the judgment
of the Court, noted that the requisite knowledge of the publisher that
obscenity was being offered may not be inferred from advertisements in
a homosexual magazine which merely give the "leer" that promises obscene
pictures to customers.2 7 In Smith v. California,28 the Supreme Court held
unconstitutional a city ordinance which imposed criminal liability on book-
sellers who unknowingly possessed obscene material, although it refused to
decide what degree of intent or knowledge the Constitution did require.29
22 The present court said, "knowledge of the commission of the substantive
offense must be brought home to them to supply the essential ingredient of intent."
Instant case at 878. In analyzing the evidence, however, the court said of the de-
fendants, "They set up the cause with this resultant effect. Did they have any reason
to know what might and did happen?" Instant case at 879. (Emphasis added.)
23Instant case at 879. Compare United States v. Falcone, 109 F.2d 579, 581
(2d Cir.), aff'd on other grounds, 311 U.S. 205 (1940), with Direct Sales Co. v.
United States, 319 U.S. 703, 708-11 (1943). "There may be also a fairly broad
latitude of immunity for a more continuous course of sales, made ...with knowledge,
but without stimulation or active incitement to purchase." Id. at 712 n.8 (dictum).
24 See Developments in the Law-Crimintl Conspiracy, 72 HAv. L. REv. 920,
930-33 (1959). See generally Note, 53 CoLum. L. Rv. 228 (1953). This requirement
safeguards the defendant from the danger that he "might be found in the net of a
conspiracy by reason of the relation of . . . [his] acts to acts of others, the signifi-
cance of which . . . [he] may not have appreciated . . . ." Von Moltke v. Gillies,
332 U.S. 708, 728 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
25 370 U.S. 478 (1962).
2618 U.S.C. § 1461 (1958).
27Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 491-95 (1962) (opinion of
Harlan, J.). "[T]he power . . . to bar a magazine from the mails, if exercised
without proof of the publisher's knowledge of the character of the advertisements
. . . [could] effectively 'impose a severe limitation on the public's access to con-
stitutionally protected matter ....... Id. at 492-93.
28361 U.S. 147 (1959).
29 Id. at 154.
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The present conviction and the court's vague opinion may improperly
deter persons from forming other homosexual-oriented correspondence
clubs, an activity apparently protected by the first amendment.30 In the
Smith case, the Supreme Court stated that otherwise-constitutional pro-
hibitions cannot be applied "where they have the collateral effect of in-
hibiting . . . freedom of expression, by making the individual the more
reluctant to exercise it.'" 31 Since being a homosexual is not itself illegal,
32
the prohibition against a group being organized because of the status of the
individuals involved 33 would seem to deny them freedom of association.3 4
Defendants' contention that the evidence showed only that they knew the
club members were homosexuals, and that this knowledge could not show
the existence of a conspiracy to transmit obscene materials knowingly,
seems correct, unless it is assumed that homosexuals have a greater
propensity than other persons to write obscenity. Such an unproven
assumption impedes defendants' constitutional freedom of speech and
association 35 by making the organization of a similar type of male
correspondence club virtually illegal per se.36
30 See note 6 supra and accompanying text. "Freedom of expression can be
suppressed if, and to the extent that, it is so closely brigaded with illegal action as
to be an inseparable part of it." Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 514 (1957)
(Douglas, J., dissenting). See also Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S.
490, 498 (1949) ; NLRB v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469, 477-78 (1941).
31 Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 150-51 (1959).
32 See Note, Decoy Enforcement of Homosexual Laws, 112 U. PA. L. Rzv. 259,
260 (1963).
33 Cf. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), 111 U. PA. L. REv. 122.
34 In Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961), a prosecution under the
Smith Act, 18 U.S.C. §2385 (Supp. IV, 1962), the Supreme Court said,
[G]roups that may embrace both legal and illegal aims differ from a technical
conspiracy, which is defined by its criminal purpose, so that all knowing asso-
ciation with the conspiracy is a proper subject for criminal proscription as
far as First Amendment liberties are concerned. If there were a similar
blanket prohibition of association with a group having both legal and illegal
aims, there would indeed be a real danger that legitimate . . . association
would be impaired ....
Id. at 229.
35 [W]hen the imposition of punishment on a status or on conduct can only
be justified by reference to the relationship of that status or conduct to other
concededly criminal activity . . . , that relationship must be sufficiently
substantial to satisfy the concept of personal guilt in order to withstand
attack under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Id. at 224-25.
Since the coconspirator club members actually transmitted obscenity, and since
the club members not transmitting obscenity were not prosecuted, the constitutional
issue could be raised only by the defendant organizers. Thus, if the freedom of
association is to be protected from encroachment by such prosecutions the non-
homosexual organizers must have standing to raise the homosexuals' freedom of
association as a matter for their own defense. "We think petitioner may assert this
right on its own behalf, because, though a corporation, it is directly engaged in those
activities, claimed to be constitutionally protected . . . ." NAACP v. Button, 371
U.S. 415, 428 (1963); see Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293,
296 (1961); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 458-60 (1958).
See also American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U.S.
184, 208-10 (1921).3SInstant case at 883 (dissenting opinion). The dissent questioned whether,
under the majority's approach, the defendants could have organized a male corre-
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DIVORCE-ENIasH COURT HOLDS THaAT NEITHER LACK OF
INTENT NOR INSANITY ARE DEFENSES IN DIvoRCE ACTIONS
GROUNDED ON MENTAT CRUELTY
Defendant spouse made no financial contribution to his household,
despite knowledge that his indolence forced his wife to provide family needs
and to assume his recurrent debts and that this caused her great emotional
distress.1 Defendant admitted his aversion to employment, but, in con-
testing the divorce action,2 he relied on the absence of proof of an intent
to injure his wife. In a three-to-two decision for the plaintiff, the House
of Lords held that when it is clearly proved that the conduct 3 of a spouse
caused the ill-health of his previously normal and healthy mate,4 such
conduct amounts to cruelty 5 under the Matrimonial Causes Act of 1950,6
even though no specific intent to injure is shown. Gollins v. Gollins,
[1963] 3 Weekly L.R. 176 (H.L.).
In a companion case, defendant spouse, who had been certified insane,7
and was periodically hospitalized, insisted that he frequently heard voices
proclaiming that his wife was a prostitute. When not in the hospital, he
caused his wife great discomfort by repeated references to her promiscuity
and by dramatic searches of their home for her alleged paramours.
Although the defendant claimed that his insanity rendered him irresponsible
for his acts, the House of Lords, again in a three-to-two decision, held
spondence club and at the same time protected themselves from a conspiracy con-
viction if some members used the club for illegal activity. Because the present court
emphasized the communications the defendants received from club members, other
club organizers apparently may avoid the present decision by rejecting as members
those who show extreme homosexual tendencies. Even this result seems to impede
freedom of speech, however, since then a homosexual could not join a correspondence
club even if his correspondence was not obscene, unless he also concealed his sexual
aberration.
1 The suit was brought by the wife to insert a noncohabitation clause in a pre-
viously granted maintenance order. Gollins v. Gollins, [1963] 3 Weekly L.R. 176,
178-79 (H.L.).
2 Careful consideration of the definition of cruelty is demanded when there is
actual litigation. Thus, this Comment deals only with contested divorces, a relatively
small percentage of the total. See JACoBsoN, AmERicAN MARRIAGE AND DIvORcE
120 (1959).
s Lord Reid stated that the act must be "inexcusable." Gollins v. Gollins, [1963]
3 Weekly L.R. 176, 185, 189 (H.L.). While this term was not defined, it was probably
used to exclude conduct based on mistake, accident, or sufficient provocation.
4 Gollins v. Gollins, mpra note 3, at 189. The evidence showed the wife to be
normal in mind and health. The House of Lords did not decide whether courts must
view the injured spouse subjectively or objectively in ascertaining the nature and
extent of the injury. See note 34 infra.
5 From language in Williams v. Williams, [1963] 3 Weekly L.R. 215, 218 (H.L.),
and indiscriminate citation of divorce and separation cases, it is clear that the House
of Lords made no distinction between the cruelty required for separation and that
which is a ground for divorce.
6 14 Geo. 6, c. 25.
7 The evidence indicated that this condition was incurable. Williams v. Williams,
[1963] 3 Weekly L.R. 215, 217 (H.L.).
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for the plaintiff, ruling that since cruelty was determined by all the
circumstances surrounding the actor's conduct and the gravity of the
injury incurred, insanity was not necessarily a defense. Williams v.
Williams, [1963] 3 Weekly L.R. 215 (H.L.).
In England, marital law was initially administered by the ecclesiastical
courts.8 In accordance with the precept that the marital relationship was
a sacred bond to be broken only by the gravest wrongdoing, a matrimonial
offense-severe injury intentionally inflicted-was the sole basis for separa-
tion.9 The matrimonial offense concept survived the transfer of juris-
diction to common-law courts, and continues to be a cornerstone of
marital law.10
Both in England and the United States, the definition of cruelty as
a ground for divorce has been left largely to the courts. The Matrimonial
Causes Act of 1937,11 which made cruelty a ground for complete divorce
in England for the first time, stated only that a divorce may be granted if
the defendant "treated the petitioner with cruelty . ... " Initially,
the courts interpreted this language as requiring a specific intent, which
had to be proved affirmatively.' 3 While the burden of proof was eased by
decisions holding that intent could be inferred in some circumstances,
14
divorces were not granted when the plaintiff merely alleged injury due to
indifference unless the court found intent through the artifice of judging
SFor a discussion of these courts see 1 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW 621-25 (3d ed. 1922).
O See 35 CALIF. L. REv. 99 (1947). In England, absolute divorce could not be
obtained except by special legislation of Parliament until 1857, when a husband was
given the right of divorce if his wife was guilty of adultery. Matrimonial Causes
Act, 1857, 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85, § 27. It was not until 1937 that cruelty gave rise to
absolute divorce.
For discussion of the historical development of American divorce law, see 1
NELSoN, DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT 1-5 (2d ed. 1945).
10 See RosEN, MATRIMONIAL OFFENSES 1-5 (1962). See generally 1 BIsHOP,
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 25-35 (6th ed. 1881) ; 1 NELSON, op. cit. supra note 9, at 1-15.
11 1 Edw. 8 & 1 Geo. 6, c. 57.
12 The same language was retained in the 1950 amendment. Matrimonial Causes
Act, 1950, 14 Geo. 6, c. 25, § 1 (c).
13 "Mere conduct which causes injury to health is not enough .... He must
prove that she has committed wilful and unjustifiable acts . . . ." Horton v. Horton,
[1940] P. 187, 193. "[Intention or malignity is an essential ingredient in cruelty."
Astle v. Astle, [1939] P. 415, 420.
The ecclesiastical courts held only that the conduct must be voluntary. See
BIGGS, THE CONCEPT OF MATRIMONIAL CRUELTY 69-75 (1962), and cases discussed
therein. Whether a specific intent was needed, or simply voluntary conduct, was
never made clear. Hall, Matrimonial Cruelty and Mens Rea, 1963 CAMB. L.J. 104,
105, has suggested that this was probably because the early courts were directed more
toward establishing the nature of the act which could amount to cruelty than to the
motives behind the act. Significantly, the early courts did not have the advantages
of modem psychological studies, so that the distinction was not meaningful to them.
14 Distinctions were made between direct and indirect conduct, and it was held
that conduct which was "aimed at one person by the other" was sufficient to con-
stitute mental cruelty even though an intent to injure could not be proved. Westall
v. Westall, 65 T.L.R. 337 (C.A. 1949); see Kaslefsky v. Kaslefsky, [1951] P. 38
(C.A.). See generally BIGOs, op. cit. supra note 13, at 82-87.
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the defendant's conduct according to a reasonable man standard.15 The
Gollins decision has discarded the necessity of such inferences and presump-
tions by its holding that specific intent is relevant in determining the degree
of harm to the marriage but is not an essential ingredient of cruelty.16
Of the forty-two states in the United States that recognize mental
cruelty as a ground for divorce, 17 only two make any statutory reference
to "wilfulness" or "intent." 18 The courts have generally not insisted on
specific intent as a prerequisite to mental cruelty, but instead examine the
effect of the defendant's conduct on the injured spouse.19 However, among
15 Jamieson v. Jamieson, [1952] A.C. 525, illustrates the use of a reasonable man
approach. The House of Lords held that while an "actual intention to hurt" is a
circumstance of great importance because such an intent is more liable to strike
with a sharper edge, it is not necessary for mental cruelty since a man may be pre-
sumed to intend the natural consequences of his actions, and if such circumstances
amount to mental cruelty, he is guilty. Compare Cade v. Cade, [1957] 1 Weekly
L.R. 569 (P. Ct), and Waters v. Waters, [1956] P. 344, with Eastland v. Eastland,
[1954] P. 403. The reasonable man standard does remove the necessity of finding
a specific intent, since it is the intent of a reasonable man rather than a particular
defendant which is judged. However, a reasonable man standard is unrealistic in
this context. As Lord Reid said, "We are dealing with this man and this woman
. . . and . . . one can hardly ever even start with a presumption that the parties
are reasonable people because it is hard to imagine any cruelty case arising if both
the spouses think and behave as reasonable people." Gollins v. Gollins, [1963] 3
Weekly L.R. 176, 183 (H.L.). (Emphasis added.)
16 Gollins v. Gollins, supra note 15, at 189, 212-13. Although this was a sepa-
ration rather than a divorce proceeding, the definition of cruelty applies to divorce
as well. See note 2 supra.
17 ALA. CODE tit. 34, § 22 (1959) ; ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 09.55.110(5) (A) (1962);
ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-312 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1202 (1962); CAL.
CIV. CODE §§ 92, 94; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-1-1 (5) (1953); CONN. GEN. STAT.
REV. § 46-13 (1958); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1522(4) (1958); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§65.04(4) (1943); GA. COnE ANN. §30-102(10) (1952); HAWAII REv. LAWS
§ 324-20(g) (Supp. 1961) ; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-603(2) (1947) ; IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 3-1201 (1946); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 598.8(5), 598.9 (1950), as amended, IowA
CODE ANN. § 598.8(5) (Supp. 1962) ; KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1501 (Supp. 1961);
Ky. REV. STAT. § 403.020 (1962); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 166, § 55 (Supp. 1961);
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 208, § 1 (1955); Micr. STAT. ANN. § 25.88 (1957) (at dis-
cretion of court) ; MINN. STAT. ANN § 518.06(3) (Supp. 1962) ; Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 2735 (1956); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.010 (1949); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. §§ 21-
103(3), 21-106 (1955); NEB. REv. STAT. §42-302 (1960); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 125.010(6) (1961); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 458:7(111) (1955); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§2A:34-2-c (1952); N.M. STAT. ANN. §22-7-1(5) (1953); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 14-05-03(2) (1960); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.01(E) (1960); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, § 1271 (1961) ; ORE. REv. STAT. § 107.030(6) (1961) ; PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 23, § 10(f) (1955) ; R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-5-2 (1956) ; S.D. CODE § 14.0703 (2)
(1939); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4629(1) (1960); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 30-3-1(7) (Supp. 1963) ; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 551(3) (1959) ; WASH. REv.
CODE ANN. § 26.08.020(5) (1961) ; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 4704 (1961) ; Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 247.07(4) (Supp. 1963); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 20-38 (1957).
18 Georgia demands that the cruelty consist of "the wilful infliction of pain, bodily
or mental . . . ." GA. CODE ANN. §30-102(10) (1953). The Hawaii statute
allows divorce "when one party to the marriage, whether intentionally, studiedly,
wilfully, deliberately, or not, inflicts grevious mental suffering ... ." HIwAwn
REv. LAWS §324-20(g) (Supp. 1961). (Emphasis added.)
19 The case first taking this approach is Robinson v. Robinson, 66 N.H. 600,
23 Atl. 362 (1891). For more recent cases, see, e.g., Smith v. Smith, 61 Ariz. 373,
149 P.2d 683 (1944); Ginsberg v. Ginsberg, 127 So. 2d 137 (Fla. Ct. App. 1961);
Ringenberg v. Ringenberg, 110 Ind. App. 290, 38 N.E.2d 870 (1942); Cimijotti v.
Cimijotti, 121 N.W.2d 537 (Iowa 1963); Bond v. Bond, 127 Me. 117, 141 At. 833
(1928); Prindes v. Prindes, 193 Va. 463, 69 S.E.2d 332 (1952); Baselt v. Baselt,
37 Wash. 2d 461, 224 P.2d 631 (1950).
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those jurisdictions which hold that a specific mental element is required,20
and therefore reject allegations of cruelty due to indifference 21 or neglect,
22
there is little agreement as to what constitutes intent; some states have
demanded that the cruelty be "directed toward" 2 or "calculated to in-
jure" 2 the other spouse, others have said that it must be a "manifestation
of hate," 25 or the "product of a malevolent motive." 
2 6
Specific intent should be an indispensible component of mental cruelty
only if society considers retribution to be a primary objective of divorce
law.2 7  When marital laws were administered by the ecclesiastical courts,
which did not recognize complete divorce, a decree requiring the defendant
to live apart from his spouse, although he was not allowed to remarry,
could be viewed as partially punitive.28 A mens rea requirement is there-
fore understandable. Modern divorce law, on the other hand, is not
designed to punish the defendant2 9 but to grant relief in intolerable situa-
tions.30 The defendant has complete freedom to remarry; furthermore, the
social stigma of divorce has lost much of its force 3l so that a person's
20 Although there are decisions which seem to limit the right to divorce for
cruelty to instances where there is the intent to injure, this intent has usually been
inferred. 1 NEI.soN, op. cit. supra note 9, at 231. A notable exception to this is
Armstrong v. Armstrong, 229 Mass. 592, 118 N.E. 916 (1918), in which proof of a
specific intent was required. However, later cases in that state allow intent to be
inferred. E.g., Rudnick v. Rudnick, 288 Mass. 256, 192 N.E. 501 (1934); Reed v.
Reed, 340 Mass. 321, 163 N.E.2d 919 (1960).
21 See Ussery v. Ussery, 259 Ala. 194, 66 So. 2d 182 (1953) ; cf. Eberwein v.
Eberwein, 193 Md. 95, 65 A.2d 792 (1949) (separation proceeding).
2 2 Smith v. Smith, 192 Md. 111, 63 A.2d 628 (1949) (separation proceeding).
23Addison v. Addison, 149 So. 2d 249 (La. 1963) (separation proceeding);
Messer v. Messer, 157 Neb. 312, 59 N.W.2d 395 (1953).
24 See Baldwin v. Baldwin, 9 So. 2d 717 (Fla. 1942); Scheinin v. Scheinin, 200
Md. 282, 89 A.2d 609 (1952) (separation proceeding) ; Argenbright v. Argenbright
110 Mont. 379, 101 P.2d 62 (1940); Dean v. Dean, 70 Ohio L. Abs. 33, 126 N.E.2d
819 (Ct. App. 1954).
25 See Preas v. Preas, 188 Ark. 854, 67 S.W.2d 1013 (1934); Ezell v. Ezell,
348 S.W.2d 592 (Mo. Ct. App. 1962); Woroley v. Woroley, 190 A.2d 167 (Pa.
Super. Ct 1963) ; Kramer v. Kramer, 194 Pa. Super. 538, 168 A.2d 624 (1961).
26 See Obennoskey v. Obennoskey, 220 S.W.2d 610 (Ark. 1949) (malice); Hill
v. Hill, 82 Cal. App. 2d 682, 187 P.2d 28 (Dist. Ct. App. 1947); cf. Grinn v. Grinn,
188 Ore. 554, 217 P.2d 248 (1950).
27 See generally Tarlo, Intention and Insanity in Divorce Law, 37 AuST. L.J. 3,
9-12 (1963).
28 See generally Neuner, Modern Divorce Law-The Compromise Solution, 28
IowA L. Rxv. 272 (1943). Martial law, as administered by the ecclesiastical courts,
was probably greatly preoccupied with the element of sin in a matrimonial offense.
2 Ibid. Although punishment may have been a factor in setting alimony in the
ecclesiastical courts, see Kempe v. Kempe, 1 Hagg. Ecc. 532, 162 Eng. Rep. 668
(1828), today it has "as its sole object the support of the wife," Eaton v. Davis,
176 Va. 330, 338, 10 S.E.2d 893, 897 (1940) ; cf. Alexander v. Alexander, 317 S.W.2d
494 (Ky. 1958), and is not to be used as a punitive measure, Byerly v. Byerly, 363
Ill. 517, 2 N.E.2d 898 (1936); Cecil v. Cecil, 179 Va. 274, 19 S.E.2d 64 (1942).
But see Morrow v. Morrow, 40 Cal. App. 2d 474, 105 P.2d 129 (1940); Driskill v.
Driskill, 181 S.W.2d 1001 (Mo. Ct. App. 1944) (alimony a compensation for a tort).
30 See, e.g., Sovereign v. Sovereign, 366 Mich. 681, 116 N.W.2d 46 (1962);
Friedman v. Friedman, 37 N.J. Super. 52, 116 A.2d 793 (1955); Steinbrugge v.
Steinbrugge, 2 N.J. 77, 65 A.2d 606 (1949); Robinson v. Robinson, 66 N.H. 600,
23 At. 362 (1891).
31 See Llewellyn, Behind the Law of Divorce, 33 COLUm. L. REv. 249,288-94 (1933).
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status as a divorcee is not generally degrading. Removal of punishment
as a consideration does not mean that divorce law is to be completely
relief-oriented; society must balance the desirability of preserving the
family unit,32 especially the interests of children, against the improbability
of an eventual reconciliation of the spouses.3 3 Relief is called for when the
injury has been great and is likely to be recurrent; when harm has been
slight, or is not likely to occur again, society's interest militates against
permitting divorce.3 4 Thus, an inquiry into the intent of the defendant is
a valuable indication of the "deterioration level" of the marriage when
cruelty is alleged. The presence of a specific intent to injure, if known
by the injured spouse, may be expected to have intensified his resentment.
In addition, it may indicate a probability of further harmful conduct by the
defendant. However, it alone should not be determinative of whether relief
can be given.
While the Gollins decision removes the requirement of specific intent,
it leaves unanswered the question of whether mental cruelty demands
proof of some minimal mental element-the simple volition to do the act.3 5
The Williams case apparently takes the next step and removes the require-
ment of volition, 6 discarding the last remnants of mens rea for mental
82 See Costello v. Costello, 22 Conn. Supp. 95, 161 A.2d 793 (Super. Ct. 1960);
1 NELSON, op. cit. supra note 9, at 15. In some jurisdictions, the state, as representa-
tive of society, may even take an active interest in divorce proceedings, State v.
Brown, 213 Ind. 118, 11 N.E.2d 679 (1937).
33 The marital relationship normally has deteriorated greatly by the time the
spouses come into court. Whether a divorce should be granted must depend on the
extent of the factual breakdown; to deny the divorce when there is no prospect of
eventual harmony between the spouses accomplishes nothing. See Rheinstein, The
Law of Divorce and the Problem of Marriage Stability, 9 VAND. L. REv. 633, 643-60
(1956). For a discussion of the social problems involved see Bradway, Proposed
New Techniques in the Law of Divorce, Part I, 28 IowA L. REv. 256 (1943). See
generally Alexander, The Follies of Divorce, 36 A.B.A.J. 105 (1950); Bradway,
Divorce Litigation and the Welfare of the Family, 9 VAND. L. REV. 665 (1956).
34 In using this approach, the plaintiff may be looked at subjectively, taking into
account his peculiarities and frailties in determining whether he had been injured,
or objectively, taking into account only whether a reasonable spouse would have been
injured by defendant's acts. Since the focus is on the probability of the spouses
getting back together, it would appear that the subjective inquiry is more appropriate.
35 For a discussion of the distinction between specific intent and volition, see
Hall, supra note 13, at 105. See generally BIGGS, op. cit. supra note 13, at 69-98.
36 Medical evidence was introduced showing that although defendant knew what
he was doing, he was unable, because of his insane hallucinations, to comprehend
that it was wrong. Williams v. Williams, [1963] 3 Weekly L.R. 215, 217 (H.L.).
Lord Reid and Lord Pearce of the majority held that the defendant was lacking
volition, but that this was no defense. Id. at 226-27, 259. Although Lord Evershed
agreed with Lord Reid and Lord Pearce that insanity was not necessarily a defense,
even if it negated volition, he expressed great uncertainty. Id. at 234. He distin-
guished between volition and a premise behind the volition, and found that while
defendant's premise was unreliable because of his insane hallucinations, there was
volition in this case. Id. at 235.
In dissent, Lord Morris found no volition and thus would have denied the divorce,
id. at 243, while Lord Hodson, distinguishing between volition and premise, found a
volition but held that a sane premise was also needed. Id. at 248-49.
The distinction between volition and the premise underlying volition has been
persuasively challenged on the ground that since all volition is based on some premise,
if the premise is erroneous because of insanity, there can be no volition, in the sense
of responsibility for one's conduct. See generally BRENNER, AN ELEMENTARY TEXT-
Boo OF PsYcHoAN aYsis 11-24 (1957) ("psychic determinism").
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cruelty.3 7 In the United States, the majority of jurisdictions have remained
committed to the concept that cruelty is an intentional wrong, at least to
the extent that they require volition and hold that insanity which negates
this volition is a defense to a divorce action grounded on cruelty.38
If relief in intolerable situations is the object of divorce law, the result
in Williants seems correct.39 Just as with specific intent, the defendant's
sanity is relevant, but not conclusive. It is clear that divorce should not
3 7 Early English cases, comprehending neither the importance of a mental element,
not the impact of insanity, often dismissed the defense as unimportant. Curtis v.
Curtis, 1 Sw. & Tr. 192, 164 Eng. Rep. 688 (Divorce Ct. 1858); White v. White,
1 Sw. & Tr. 591, 164 Eng. Rep. 874 (Divorce Ct 1859); contra, Hayward v. Hay-
ward, 1 Sw. & Tr. 81, 164 Eng. Rep. 638 (Divorce Ct. 1858).
Later, insanity became a defense, and after 1892, the M'Naghten rules, 10 Cl.
& Fin. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843), were generally considered applicable to
divorce law as the test of legal responsibility. Hanbury v. Hanbury, 8 T.L.R. 559
(C.A. 1892), a.irnizing [1892] P. 222. Before 1892, the vague lunacy laws of the
period were used as the test of an unsound mind. BIGGS, op. cit. supra note 13, at 105.
In recent years, there was much confusion about whether insanity was a defense.
In 1950 it was stated that "insanity . . . will not necessarily afford a defense,"
although the offending spouse must still have the volition to commit the act. White
v. White, [1950] P. 39, 52 (C.A.). The dissent, calling for complete removal of
insanity as a defense, was accepted in Lissack v. Lissack, [1951] P. 1, 7, which held
that insanity was not a defense because "the court's duty to interfere is intended
not to punish the husband for the past, but to protect the wife for the future." This,
in turn, was rejected by Swan v. Swan, [1953] P. 258 (C.A.), and Palmer v. Palmer,
[1955] P. 4 (C.A.), in which insanity was again a defense to be determined by both
branches of the M'Naghten rules.
38 See, e.g., Bosveld v. Bosveld, 232 Iowa 1199, 7 N.W.2d 782 (1943); Rice v.
Rice, 332 Mass. 489, 125 N.E.2d 787 (1955) ; Nelson v. Nelson, 108 Ohio App. 365,
154 N.E.2d 653 (1958); Hansell v. Hansell, 3 Pa. Dist. 724 (C.P. Philadelphia
County 1894). Even in Dochelli v. Dochelli, 125 Conn. 468, 6 A.2d 324 (1939),
and King v. King, 214 Ky. 171, 283 S.W. 73 (1926), which have been characterized
as "tantamount to a ruling that insanity is no defense at all," HARPER, PROBLEMS OF
THE FAMILY 708 (1952), the courts make no statement that insanity is no longer
a defense. In fact, in Dochelli, the court found that the defendant could tell the
difference between right and wrong and only found that her mental disorder was
insufficient to constitute insanity. In King, although the court allowed a divorce
proceeding on cruelty after the defendant had been declared legally insane, there is
no mention of whether he was insane at the time he committed the cruel acts. In
the revised edition, Harper makes no mention of these cases. HAPER & SKOLNICK,
PROBLEMS OF THE FAMILY (rev. ed. 1962).
The M'Naghten "right-wrong" test is generally used to determine insanity, see,
e.g., Fansler v. Fansler, 344 Mich. 569, 75 N.W.2d 1 (1956), although there are
some exceptions. Kansas previously used M'Naghten, Toepffer v. Toepffer, 151 Kan.
924, 101 P.2d 904 (1940), but now appears to be following a Durham test, Crosby v.
Crosby, 186 Kan. 420, 350 P.2d 796 (1960), 10 Kan. L. Rev. 95 (1961). Ohio
appears to use only the first branch of M'Naghten. Nelson v. Nelson, supra. Penn-
sylvania apparently uses a type of "sliding scale" test whereby different standards
of insanity may be needed depending on the grounds for divorce. Manley v. Manley,
193 Pa. Super. 252, 164 A.2d 113 (1960).
For a discussion of the difficulties in applying the M'Naghten rules to this area
see Goodhart, Cruelty, Desertion, and Insanity in Matrimonial Law, 79 L.Q. Rxv.
98, 116-25 (1963) ; Hall, supra note 13, at 112. Compare Anonymous v. Anonymous,
37 Misc. 2d 773, 236 N.Y.S.2d 288 (Sup. Ct. 1962). See also 24 MODERN L. Rzv.
382 (1961).
39 The Royal Commission of England, while retaining the principle of matri-
monial fault has removed the intent requirement and recommended that insanity no
longer be a defense to cruelty. Royal Commission on Marriage and Divorce, Report,
CMD. No. 9678, 1256, at 76 (1956).
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be granted every time hardship strikes the marital relationship.40 The
interests of society are often best served by the preservation of the marriage
when insanity and the cruelty which is its product are transitory. In
addition, the assistance of the family may be crucial to recovery in this
circumstance. On the other hand, when the probabilities of further harm
are substantial and there is little chance of recovery, society's interest in
establishing a normal family life might better be served by allowing the
healthy spouse to terminate the marriage and enter into a normal relation-
ship with someone else.4 1
While most American jurisdictions continue to demand volition as an
ingredient of cruelty, many states have attempted to afford relief by enacting
statutes operating outside of the concept of matrimonial offense. Thirty
states now recognize divorce on the ground of incurable insanity; 
4 2
twenty-two states allow divorce when there has been mutual or voluntary
separation for a specified number of years; 4 3 and three recognize divorce
40 For a study of some of the problems of modern living which influence the rate
of divorce and some proposed remedies see, e.g., Royal Commission on Marriage and
Divorce, supra note 39, 11143-54, at 8-11.
41 See Schneider, Unsoundness of Mind as Ground for Divorce, 1944 Wis.
L. REv. 106.
4 ALA. CODE tit. 34, § 20.7 (1959); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 09-55-110(8) (1962);
ARK. STAT. ANN. §34-1202 (1962); CAL. CIV. CODE § 108; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 46-1-1(9) (1953); CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 46-13 (1958) ; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13,
§ 1522(10) (Supp. 1962) ; GA. CODE ANN. § 30-102(11) (1952) ; HAWAII Rxv. LAWS
§ 324-20(d) (Supp. 1961) ; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-603(7) (1947) ; IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 3-1201 (1946); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1501 (Supp. 1961); Ky. REv. STAT.
§ 403.020(5) (a) (1962); MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 26 (Supp. 1963); MINN. STAT.
ANN. §518.06(7) (Supp. 1962); Miss. CODE ANN. §2735 (1956); MONT. Rzv.
CODES ANN. §21-103(1) (1955); NE. REv. STAT. §42-301(7) (1960); NEv. REv.
STAT. §125.010(8) (1961); N.M. STAT. ANN. §22-7-7 (1953); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 50-5.6 (Supp. 1961); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-05-03(7) (1960); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit 12, § 1271 (1961) ; ORE. REv. STAT. § 107.030(7) (1961) ; S.D. CODE § 14.0703 (7)
(1939); TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4629(6) (1960); UTAH CODE ANN.
§30-3-1(9) (Supp. 1963); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §551(6) (1959); WASH. Rv.
CODE ANN. §26.08.020(10) (1961); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §20-39 (1957).
The typical insanity provisions demand a commitment of from two to five years
in a mental hospital or institution, and medical testimony, often by a committee of
physicians, that the defendant is incurably insane. See LINDMAN & McINT-RE, THE
MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 212-13 (1961).
43 ALA. CODE tit. 34, § 22(1) (1959) ; ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-312 (1956);
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1202 (1962) ; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1522(11) (Supp. 1962);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-610 (1947); Ky. REv. STAT. § 403.020(1) (b) (1962); LA.
Civ. CODE ANN. art. 138(9) (Supp. 1962), art. 139 (West 1952); MD. ANN. CODE
art 16, §24 (Supp. 1963); MINN. STAT. ANN. §518.06(8) (Supp. 1962); NEV. REV.
STAT. §125.010 (1961); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §458:7 (Supp. 1963); N.C. GEN.
STAT. §50-6 (1950); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-06-05 (1960); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN.
§ 15-5-3 (1956) ; TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4629(4) (1960) ; UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 30-3-1(8) (Supp. 1963) ; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 551(7) (1959) ; VA. CODE ANN.
§20-91(9) (1950); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §26.08.020(9) (1961); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 247.07(6), .07(7) (Supp. 1963); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 20-47 (1957); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 16-403 (1961).
The typical "living-apart" statutes require a separation period from two to ten
years. Generally, either spouse may sue for the divorce, although some states limit
this right to the party not at fault Further, a minority of states only recognize
separations which were pursuant to court decrees of separate maintenance. See Note,
1959 WASH. U.L.Q. 189.
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on the ground of incompatibility.44 Essentially, these statutes acknowledge
that a marriage can deteriorate absent fault by either spouse. Although
these statutes have liberalized divorce,45 they do not provide adequate
answers to the problems raised by the present cases. Insanity statutes
allow a healthy spouse to start over again, but are limited to incurable
mental disorders with commitment in a mental hospital for a period of
years. They do not reach the case of the insane but nonhospitalized
defendant who continues to inflict harm upon his spouse. The separation
statutes, depending upon consent of both parties, cannot adequately grant
relief when one party is inflicting harm but will not consent to live apart.4 6
The incompatibility statutes are certainly broad enough to allow relief in
the situations presented by the present cases, since injury to the com-
plaining spouse is not a requisite; however, their application is so inclusive
that they may indiscriminately sacrifice society's interest in preserving the
marriage whenever a spouse complains of trivial difficulties that exist in
any close relationship.
As the present cases indicate, there is no necessity to go outside the
concept of cruelty to find a solution. An approach which finds cruelty by
looking to the nature and extent of the injury enables the court to balance
the interests of preservation and relief.
ILLEGITIMACY-Two STATE STPREmE COurTS DvirE UPoN
ADMISSIBILITY OF SPOUSES' TESTImONY AS TO NOxACESS
A common-law rule of evidence, the Mansfield rule, excludes the
testimony, declarations, or admissions of either spouse as to sexual non-
access when the legitimacy of a child conceived, or born during the marriage
is in issue.' The Supreme judicial Court of Maine, observing the unjust
and inconsistent results of the rule's application, has recently rejected it in
a three-to-two decision.2 However, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
44 ALAscA STAT. ANN. §09.55.110(5) (1962); N.M. STAT. ANN. §22-7-1(8)
(1953) ; OLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1271 (1961). For discussion of incompatibility
as a ground for divorce see Burch v. Burch, 195 F.2d 799 (3d Cir. 1952) ; 7 OKLA.
L. REv. 99 (1954).4 5 Their purpose is to deal with a social and economic status with the object of
terminating a situation "barren of good, capable of evil, and probably irremediable
by any other means." Barrington v. Barrington, 206 Ala. 192, 194, 89 So. 512, 513
(1921) (discussing separation statute).
46 In the few states where divorce can be granted pursuant to a court-ordered
separation, the interest of relief is satisfied in that defendant is barred from further
association with the petitioner, but the petitioner must still wait the statutory period
for a complete divorce, even when it is clear that the marriage is beyond repair.
1 In announcing the rule, Lord Mansfield referred to children born after marriage.
Goodright v. Moss, 2 Cowp. 591, 98 Eng. Rep. 1257 (K.B. 1777) (dictum). The rule
has been logically applied to cases in which a child was conceived during a marriage
which was subsequently terminated by divorce prior to the child's birth. See, e.g.,
People v. Bedell, 342 Mich. 398, 70 N.W.2d 808 (1955) ; State v. Bowman, 230 N.C.
203, 52 S.E.2d 345 (1949).
2 In a bastardy action, the parties stipulated that the plaintiff's husband had been
overseas for seventeen months prior to the child's birth. Rejecting the defendant's
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Virginia, one judge dissenting, has held that the rule is too well settled to
be overturned except by legislative direction.3
Most jurisdictions accept the Mansfield rule in some form. 4 Although
a minority of states has completely rejected the rule,5 statutory abrogation
has largely been confined to bastardy and nonsupport proceedings.6 Courts
have been reluctant to abandon the rule in the absence of specific legisla-
tion,7 which has usually been narrowly construed.
8
There is a strong presumption that a child conceived or born in wed-
lock is legitimate.9 The party who disputes legitimacy normally has the
burden of proof,' 0 which is often higher than the "preponderance" stand-
ard.1 This burden is imposed primarily because of the serious conse-
quences of a declaration of illegitimacy on the innocent child: the loss of
rights to support and inheritance from the mother's husband, psychological
effects, and possible disruption of social status and relationships built up
over many years. The emotional and social consequences become more
contention that the plaintiff did not have standing to sue, the court abrogated the
Mansfield rule in dictum, viewing the stipulation as the equivalent of the plaintiff's
testimony. Ventresco v. Bushey, 191 A.2d 104 (Me. 1963).
3 In a bastardy action, the plaintiff and her husband testified as to nonaccess,
over the defendant's objection. The court reversed defendant's conviction, holding
that the testimony should have been excluded. State ex rel. Worley v. Lavender,
131 S.E.2d 752 (W. Va. 1963).
4 See McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE § 67 (1954); 7 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE § 2063 (3d ed.
1940) ; 97 C.J.S. Witnesses § 90 (1957).
5 The Field code section, adopted in five states, provides that "illegitimacy . . .
may be proved like any other fact." CAL. CIV. CODE § 195; MONT. REV. CODES ANN.
§ 61-103 (1962) ; N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-03 (1960) ; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 3
(1951); S.D. CODE § 14.0302 (1939). One other state appears to have generally
rejected the rule by statute. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 328.39 (Supp. 1963), Vorvilas v.
Vorvilas, 252 Wis. 333, 31 N.W.2d 586 (1948).
6 See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 273, § 7 (1956) (nonsupport and bastardy);
N.Y. FAm. CT. ACT § 531 (bastardy); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-15-2 (1953) (non-
support).
7 See, e.g., Morris v. Morris, 40 Del. (1 Ter.) 480, 13 A.2d 603 (1940) ; State
ex rel. Dolloff v. Sargent, 100 N.H. 29, 118 A.2d 596 (1955) ; State ex rel. Worley
v. Lavender, 131 S.E.2d 752 (W. Va. 1963).
8 See People ex rel. Cullison v. Dile, 347 Ill. 23, 179 N.E. 93 (1931) (mother's
testimony admissible by statute but husband's barred) ; Sayles v. Sayles, 323 Mass. 66,
80 N.E.2d 21 (1948) (dictum). One legislature has indicated that rejection should
be strictly limited. See N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 38-a.
9 See, e.g., In re Findlay, 253 N.Y. 1, 7, 170 N.E. 471, 472 (1930). Conflicting
presumptions arise when the mother is married to one man at the time of conception
and another at the time of birth. In such cases, since the child is in little danger of
being declared illegitimate, there has been some tendency to reduce the strength of
both presumptions. See Vulgamore v. Unknown Heirs of Vulgamore, 7 Ohio App.
374 (1916). However, at least one court has presumed that the husband at the time
of conception is the father. Burtis v. Weiser, 195 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. Civ. App.
1946), 26 NEB. L. REv. 127 (1946), 25 TEXAS L. REv. 428 (1947). Other courts
have reached the opposite conclusion. Zachmann v. Zachmann, 201 Ill. 380, 66 N.E.
256 (1903); Bower v. Graham, 285 Mo. 151, 225 S.W. 978 (1920). Compare note
44 infra. See generally Annot., 57 A.L.R.2d 729, 778-85 (1958).
10 See In re Jones' Estate, 110 Vt. 438, 8 A.2d 631 (1939) ; McCoRMicK, EVI-
DENCE § 309, at 646 (1954).
11 See, e.g., Peters v. District of Columbia, 84 A.2d 115, 119 (D.C. Munic. Ct.
App. 1951) ("clear proof") ; Ventresco v. Bushey, 191 A.2d 104, 108 (Me. 1963)
("beyond a reasonable doubt"); In re Findlay, 253 N.Y. 1, 7, 170 N.E. 471, 473
(1930) ("not . . . a choice between nicely balanced probabilities"). One state has
established the standard by statute. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 328.39 (Supp. 1963) ("clear
and satisfactory preponderance of the evidence").
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serious as the child grows older, and can be severe even when the disputant
is unsuccessful.
The Mansfield rule makes illegitimacy more difficult to establish since
proof of nonaccess is one of the few ways in which the presumption of
legitimacy can be successfully rebutted.12 Since nonaccess, because of its
personal nature, is frequently within the peculiar knowledge of the spouses,
exclusion of their evidence coupled with the requirement of a high degree
of proof often precludes findings of illegitimacy.
13
Proponents of the Mansfield rule have relied upon stare decisis and
reiterated that the rule is founded on "decency, morality and policy." 14
The evidence itself, which generally consists of statements concerning the
geographical location of the spouses during the crucial period, can hardly
be characterized as indecent, particularly when the wife's testimony as to
her adultery is admissible. 15 There is nothing immoral in a spouse's
attempt to bastardize the child; supporters of the rule recognize that the
husband may contest legitimacy so long as the spouses themselves do not
testify,16 and the wife's standing, at least in a bastardy proceeding, has
been provided by the legislatures of many states.17
The Mansfield rule has apparently persisted because it indirectly
tends to prevent findings of illegitimacy; the social value of protecting the
fiction of a person's legitimacy often outweighs the interest which seeks
to dispute it. There is some rational basis for the rule. When the fact
of nonaccess is known by others, so that it can be proved without the
spouses' evidence, there may be less chance that any substantial relation-
ships based on legitimacy will have been established. This consideration,
however, seems less applicable in today's mobile and impersonal society.
The current effectiveness of the Mansfield rule is impaired by the
availability of blood test evidence by which nonpaternity, and thus illegiti-
macy, may be established without proof of nonaccess.18 Such evidence
1 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Kitchen, 299 Mass. 7, 11 N.E.2d 482 (1937) ; State
v. Bowman, 230 N.C. 203, 52 S.E.2d 345 (1949); Cairgle American Radiator v.
Standard Sanitary Corp., 366 Pa. 249, 77 A.2d 439 (1951).
13 "Is it reasonable to assume that the legislature intended to give a right with
a remedy so harshly curtailed as to amount almost to a denial thereof?" State ex rel.
Worley v. Lavender, 131 S.E.2d 752, 761 (W. Va. 1963) (dissenting opinion).
14 See, e.g., Ventresco v. Bushey, 191 A.2d 104 (Me. 1963) (dissenting opinion);
State ex rel. Worley v. Lavender, 131 S.E.2d 752 (W. Va. 1963).
15 Ventresco v. Bushey, mipra note 14, at 106 (dictum) ; 7 WiomoE, EVIDENCE
§ 2064 (3d ed. 1940).
16 Ventresco v. Bushey, supra note 14, at 112 (dissenting opinion).
17 See, e.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 166, § 23 (1954) ("a woman pregnant
with . . .or . . .delivered of a bastard child"), Ventresco v. Bushey, supra note
14, at 105; Miss. CODE ANN. § 383-01 (Supp. 1962) ("a child born out of lawful
matrimony also includes a child born to a married woman by a man other than her
lawful husband"); W. VA. CODE ANN. §4770 (1961) ("married woman . . . [who
lives] separate and apart from her husband for . . .one year or more . ... ).
See also Moore v. Smith, 178 Miss. 383, 172 So. 317 (1937) (divorcee is "single
woman" within meaning of bastardy statute and thus may sue in such a proceeding).
18 See, e.g., State ex rel. Dolloff v. Sargent, 100 N.H. 29, 118 A.2d 596 (1955);
Commonwealth ex rel. Goldman v. Goldman, 199 Pa. Super. 274, 184 A.2d 351 (1962);
cf. Jordan v. Mace, 144 Me. 351, 69 A.2d 670 (1949). Blood tests may now be
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may force courts to consider the underlying question of whether legitimacy
may be disputed rather than how it may be refuted.19
Most states do not limit standing to dispute legitimacy.20  Only
Louisiana, where the civil law permits the husband alone to question
legitimacy, 21 and the five states that have adopted the Field code, limiting
standing to "the husband or wife, or the descendants of one or both of
them," 2 appear to have faced this issue squarely. Although exclusionary
rules of evidence may preclude undesirable findings,2 3 and may deter
litigants from raising issues they will be unable to prove,' they do not
always prevent litigation.
25
ordered by the courts in many states. E.g., CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1980.3; ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 106Y4, § 1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1962); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A-83-3 (1952);
PA. STAT. A9,N. tit. 28, § 307.1 (Supp. 1962); see 9 UNIFORm LAWS ANN. 102-14
(1957).
19 The effect of the Mansfield rule in retarding the development of such prin-
ciples was admitted by one court, which stated that "the strict rules relating to the
evidence . . . kept the questions of estoppel and laches from becoming an issue."
Commonwealth ex rel. Goldman v. Goldman, 199 Pa. Super. 274, 283, 184 A.2d 351,
355 (1962) (dictum). See also Commonwealth ex rel. Weston v. Weston, 193 A.2d
782 (Pa. Super. 1963), in which the court refused to order blood tests in a nonsupport
action when the husband had not previously questioned the legitimacy of three and
four year old children.
20 One court has expressly stated that anyone with an interest may dispute
legitimacy. Wright v. Hicks, 12 Ga. 155, 162-63 (1852); see Moore v. Smith, 178
Miss. 383, 394, 172 So. 317, 321 (1937) ("legitimacy . . . can always be inquired
into"). Most courts and legislatures have been silent on the question implying, at
least, that there are no limitations. See generally Annot., 53 A.L.R.2d 572 (1957).
21 LA. CiV. CODE ANN. art. 191 (West 1952), quoted note 38 infra; State v.
Randall, 219 La. 578, 53 So. 2d 689 (1951) ; Succession of Saloy, 95 La. 433, 10 So.
872 (1892). If the husband should die within the allowable period, the right descends
to his heirs. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 192 (West 1952). See generally 1 PLANIOL,
Civi. LAW TREATISE §§ 1422, 1425 (1959) ; Comment, 13 LA. L. REv. 587 (1953).
2 MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 61-103 (1962) ; N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-03 (1960);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 3 (1951) ; S.D. CODE § 14.0302 (1939). The California
statute has recently been amended to allow the state to question legitimacy, but only
for the express purpose of a prosecution under its criminal nonsupport statute. CAL.
CIV. CODE § 195 (Supp. 1962). For a case in which the state sought to prove illegiti-
macy for another purpose, see State v. Rogers, 133 S.E.2d 1 (N.C. 1963) (mother's
testimony excluded to reverse defendant's incest conviction).
Having thus limited standing, the authors of the code deemed exclusionary rules
of evidence unnecessary, and provided that "illegitmacy . . . may be proved like any
other fact." N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-03 (1960), State v. Fury, 53 N.D. 333, 205
N.W. 877 (1925) ; accord, In re Wray's Estate, 93 Mont. 525, 19 P.2d 1051 (1933);
Estate of Kessler, 76 S.D. 158, 74 N.W.2d 599 (1956).
23 Courts have also excluded proof of impotency. See Bassil v. Ford Motor Co.,
278 Mich. 173, 270 N.W. 258 (1936) (physician-patient privilege); cf. Taylor v.
Whittier, 240 Mass. 514, 138 N.E. 6 (1922). One court refused to order blood tests
on the ground that a husband's allegation of illegitimacy in contesting a support order
did not constitute a "proceeding to determine paternity." Commonwealth ex rel.
O'Brien v. O'Brien, 390 Pa. 551, 553, 136 A.2d 451, 452 (1957).
24 See Amato v. Amato, 45 N.Y.S.2d 371 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1943). In a support
proceeding the husband did not contest the child's legitimacy because, as the court
stated, his "counsel realistically recognized the sisyphean burden" of proving non-
paternity in the face of the Mansfield rule. Id. at 372.
25 Even stronger deterrents to undesirable litigation are criminal penalties for
filing or threatening to file an action. E.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 75C, §§ 2, 8 (1957)
(breach of promise to marry); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, §§ 171, 173 (Supp. 1962)
(same).
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Whatever the reasons for protecting legitimacy, they disappear when the
party seeking to dispute it is the person himself.2 6 Such a person has
elected to forego any economic, psychological, or social advantages which
may adhere to that status. This situation has, therefore, prompted two
courts to reject the Mansfield rule.
2 7
When a legislature grants standing to a married woman to institute
a bastardy proceeding, it has determined that the consequences of the
necessary dispute of the child's legitimacy are outweighed by the child's
interest in support.2 8 Since the imposition of the Mansfield rule in bastardy
cases protects only the defendant 2 9 and may deprive the child of its only
source of private support, several legislatures 30 and courts 3 1 have rejected
it in bastardy proceedings. In such proceedings, the mother asserts no
independent right but is authorized by the state to represent the child's
interest. But a mother who spuriously represents her child as her
husband's has been effectively barred from subsequently proving its
illegitimacy, to further her own independent interest, by imposition of the
Mansfield rule.3 2  In such cases, she would seem properly estopped from
destroying the very relationships which she has helped to establish.
When a husband seeks to dispute the legitimacy of his wife's child,
usually to avoid support, his interest is adverse to that of the child. Only
compelling considerations should require a man to support a child that is
not his own; some legislatures have therefore rejected the Mansfield rule
26 Relatives of an intestate decedent who has acknowledged an illegitimate child
may seek to defeat the child's right to inherit by proving that the mother was married
to another man at the time of the child's birth. See, e.g., Lynch v. Rosenberger,
121 Kan. 601, 249 Pac. 682 (1926).
2 7 11 re McNamara's Estate, 181 Cal. 82, 183 Pac. 552 (1919) (distinguishing
earlier decision sustaining Mansfield rule under Field code) ; Lynch v. Rosenberger,
sipra note 26. But see Grates v. Garcia, 20 N.M. 158, 148 Pac. 493 (1915) ; Barr's
Next of Kin v. Cherokee, Inc., 220 S.C. 447, 68 S.E.2d 440 (1951). Two courts
held the rule inapplicable since the mother had subsequently married the real father
and the child would in no event be illegitimate. Dudley's Adm'r v. Fidelity & Deposit
Co., 240 S.W.2d 76 (Ky. 1951); In re Wrightes Estate, 237 Mich. 375, 211 N.W.
746 (1927).
28 See Peters v. District of Columbia, 84 A.2d 115 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1951).
2 "The foundation of the rule is much firmer when it is invoked for the pro-
tection of the child . . . than when invoked as a shield by an alleged adulterer."
Commissioner of Public Welfare v. Koehler, 284 N.Y. 260, 267, 30 N.E.2d 587, 591
(1940) (dictum).
80 E.g., MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 273, § 7 (1956); N.Y. FAm. CT. AcT § 531.
31 Peters v. District of Columbia, 84 A.2d 115 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1951);
Vasquez v. Esquibel, 141 Colo. 5, 346 P.2d 293 (1959); State v. Soyka, 181 Minn.
533, 233 N.W. 300 (1930) (construed statute making parties competent as an abro-
gation of the rule) ; Ventresco v. Bushey, 191 A.2d 104 (Me. 1963) ; Moore v. Smith,
178 Miss. 383, 172 So. 317 (1937); Yerian v. Brinker, 35 N.E.2d 878 (Ohio App.
1941). But see People v. Bedell, 342 Mich. 398, 70 N.W.2d 808 (1955); State v.
Bowman, 230 N.C. 203, 52 S.E.2d 345 (1949); State ex rel. Worley v. Lavender,
131 S.E.2d 752 (W. Va. 1963).
32 Veron's Adm'r v. Veron, 228 Ky. 56, 14 S.W.2d 185 (1929) (mother sought
to deprive husband of son's death benefit); In re Adoption of Anonymous Minor
Child, 192 Mis. 359, 77 N.Y.S.2d 121 (Surr. Ct. 1948) (over objection of first hus-
band, mother and second husband sought to adopt child born during first marriage).
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in nonsupport proceedings.3 3 At least one court has rejected it in a divorce
case, 3 4 and a few courts avoided the rule in divorce actions in which the
husband sought to prove his wife's adultery by showing that she had
borne a bastard, holding that adultery, not legitimacy, was in issue.3 5
Their reasoning was buttressed by statutes providing that a divorce granted
on the grounds of the wife's adultery had no effect on the status of the
children.3 6
However, when a husband acts in a manner which seemingly acknowl-
edges his wife's child as his own, the child's interest in maintaining the
fiction of legitimacy should estop the husband from subsequently challeng-
ing that status. The Mansfield rule has frequently been invoked to bar
his proof of nonpaternity in such circumstances.3 7 Even in the absence
of conduct which would constitute an estoppel, the husband's right to put
the child's legitimacy in issue should be limited to a reasonable time after
he learns of the child's birth.3 8  He should not be allowed to raise the
question thereafter.3 9
When the husband himself has not disputed legitimacy, the Mansfield
rule has unhesitatingly been invoked to exclude proof of illegitimacy by
his relatives in cases in which they seek to share in his estate or death
3 3 E.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 273, §§ 1, 7 (1956) ; UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-15-1
to -2 (1953).
34 In Loudon v. Loudon, 114 N.J. Eq. 242, 168 At. 840 (Ct. Err. & App. 1933),
the court construed as abrogating the rule a statute making spouses competent wit-
nesses against each other in a divorce proceeding. The court also noted that the
rule was promulgated in 1777, after the date of reception of English law.
3 5 M onahan v. Monahan, 142 Me. 72, 46 A.2d 706 (1946) ; Sayles v. Sayles, 323
Mass. 66, 80 N.E.2d 21 (1948) ; Biggs v. Biggs, 253 N.C. 10, 116 S.E.2d 178 (1960).
But see Harward v. Harward, 173 Md. 339, 196 Atl. 318 (1937). In Ventresco v.
Bushey, 191 A.2d 104 (Me. 1963), the court rejected the artificiality of this reasoning
when it said, "as a practical matter the status of the child was involved since no court
would be likely to order the husband to make support payments for the child on such
evidence." Id. at 107.
Z6 MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 208, § 25 (1955); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-11 (Supp.
1961). The conclusiveness of such a decree upon the child's status is questionable.
In Carnes v. Kay, 210 S.W.2d 882 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948), the husband sought to
have a divorce decree modified to show that he was not the child's father. In Byrd v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 275 S.W.2d 861 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955), the husband's parents,
after the husband's death, challenged the child's rights to workmen's compensation
benefits, despite a previous divorce decree acknowledging the child as the issue of
the marriage. In both cases the Mansfield rule was invoked to exclude proof of
illegitimacy.
37 See, e.g., State v. Campo, 233 N.C. 79, 62 S.E.2d 500 (1950) (husband lived
with wife and child for fifteen months after child's birth); Carnes v. Kay, supra
note 36 (husband did not contest support order in previous divorce decree). Com-
pare Commonwealth ex reL Weston v. Weston, 193 A.2d 782 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1963).
38 The father, if he intends to dispute the legitimacy of the child, must do it
within one month, if he is in the place where the child is born, or within two
months after his return, if he be absent at that time, or within two months
after the discovery of the fraud, if the birth of the child was concealed from
him . . ..
LA. CiV. CODE ANN. art. 191 (West (1952).
39 Cf. Jones v. State, 261 S.W.2d 324 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 346 U.S.
859 (1953) (divorce decree did not mention child whose legitimacy was questioned);
Hicks v. State, 263 S.W. 291 (Tex. Crim. App. 1924) (husband left immediately
after birth of child but took no legal action).
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benefits.40  A few courts, while basing their holdings on the Mansfield
doctrine, have stated in dictum that the husband's failure to raise the
question, whether through choice 4 ' or inability,42 should be conclusive as
to the child's legitimacy. In such cases, the disputant's interest, usually
solely pecuniary, may threaten the financial, social, and psychological
security of the child.
Since the interest of the husband's relatives in disputing legitimacy is
derivative from his interest, their rights should rise no higher than his.
Whatever restrictions are placed on the husband's right to question
legitimacy, by estoppel or limitation of time, should apply with equal force
to his relatives. Standing to raise the issue should descend to them only
in the event of his death and under the same time restrictions that would
apply to him if he survived.
43
The apparent contemporary purpose of the Mansfield rule-to dis-
courage disputes of legitimacy and to prevent undesirable findings of
illegitimacy-would be more effectively served by abolition of the rule
and the substitution of legislation addressed directly to the issue of standing.
The following suggested statute is illustrative.
PROPOSED STATE STATUTE
1. As used in this statute, the term "child" shall mean any person
whose legitimacy is sought to be disputed in a legal proceeding.
2. A child either born or conceived while the mother is married is
presumed to be legitimate.
3. If the child's mother is married at the time of the child's birth,
her husband at such time shall be presumed to be the child's father.4 If
40 See Taylor v. Whittier, 240 Mass. 514, 138 N.E. 6 (1922) (husband's rela-
tives); Bassil v. Ford Motor Co., 278 Mich. 173, 270 N.W. 258 (1936) (second
wife) ; Richter v. Richter, 117 Ore. 621, 245 Pac. 321 (1926) (second wife and three
children) ; Byrd v. Travelers Ins. Co., 275 S.W.2d 861 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955)
(husband's parents). Even a complete stranger may have an interest to dispute
legitimacy. See Gonzales v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 34 Cal. 2d 749, 214 P.2d 809
(1950) (bus company attempted to escape liability in wrongful death action by proving
plaintiff was not son of decedent).
41 "If the father renounces the right to bastardize his alleged son, either ex-
pressly or tacitly, it is extinguished and can never thereafter be exercised by anyone."
Byrd v. Travelers Ins. Co., supra note 40, at 863-64 (dictum).
42 "If the [husband] . . . could not be permitted to deny the legitimacy of a
child . . .much less could a third party be permitted to testify as to . . . [his]
declarations on that subject." Richter v. Richter, 117 Ore. 621, 632, 245 Pac. 321,
324 (1926) (dictum).
43 Compare LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 192 (West 1952). Compare Byrd v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 275 S.W.2d 861 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955) (divorce decree, without
objection from husband, had acknowledged child of the marriage), with In re
Tinker's Estate, 91 Okla. 21, 215 Pac. 779 (1923) (husband died before child's birth).
In Byrd, it would seem that any heirs, regardless of their relationship to the husband,
would be properly barred from questioning legitimacy. In Tinker, however, the
husband's heirs should have been allowed to assert a claim which the husband did
not have the opportunity to raise in his own behalf.
44 See Zachmann v. Zachmann, 201 Ill. 380, 66 N.E. 256 (1903); Bower v.
Graham, 285 Mo. 151, 225 S.W. 978 (1920). Compare note 9 supra. Not only does
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the child's mother is unmarried at the time of the child's birth, but was
married at the probable time of the child's conception, her husband at
such time shall be presumed to be the child's father.
4. The legitimacy of any child may be disputed only by:
a) the child; 
4 5
b) the presumed father, but only within six months after he
learns of the birth of the child or before the child reaches the age
of five years, whichever is sooner; 
46
c) the heirs of the presumed father with an interest in his estate
adverse to that of the child, but only if the presumed father should die
before the expiration of the period allowed to him under subsection
(b) and only within the period in which the presumed father might
have disputed legitimacy had he survived;
47
d) any other person, including the state, as specifically provided
by statute
4 8
5. In cases governed by section 4, the party disputing legitimacy
shall have the burden of proving illegitimacy by a preponderance of the
evidence. Both the mother and the presumed father of the child shall be
competent to testify as to their nonaccess to each other and to any other
relevant fact.
6. Except in cases governed by section 4, the presumption of legiti-
macy shall be conclusive.
RODUCTS LIABILITY-CIGARETTE MANNUFACTURER LiAsii
FOR DEATHr OF LUNG CANCER VICTIM ALTHOUGH JURY Fo-uiD IT
CouLD NOT FoREsE THAT LUNG CANCER MIGHT RESULT FRoM
SMOKING
Decedent smoked cigarettes from 1924 until 1956, when it was
discovered that he had lung cancer, which thereafter caused his death.
In a federal diversity action against a tobacco manufacturer for wrongful
this presumption seem more probable, but, as was said in Bower v. Graham, spra
at 160, 225 S.W. at 979, "birth was . . . open and visible . . . . [C]onception
. . . [was] uncertain at its best . . . ." Moreover, since the welfare of the
child is the primary concern, this provision helps the child to become a member of
a viable family unit.
45 See text accompanying notes 26-27 supra.
46 See text accompanying notes 33-39 supra. The five-year time limit balances
a concern for the presumed father who is justifiably ignorant of the child's birth
against a realization that at about the age of five the child becomes aware of his
status, and a legal dispute that upsets this status might produce severe emotional
consequences.
47 See text accompanying notes 40-43 mipra.4 8 This provision would enable the mother to dispute legitimacy in a bastardy
proceeding, but not for purposes unauthorized by statute. See text accompanying
notes 28-32 mipra.
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death,1 the jury found that cigarettes caused the decedent's lung cancer
and ultimate demise. It returned a verdict for the defendant, however,
because it also found that before 1956 the defendant could not reasonably
have foreseen the injury.2  The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
initially affirmed,3 but on rehearing certified to the Supreme Court of
Florida the question whether under Florida law a cigarette manufacturer
is absolutely liable although it could not have foreseen the injury.4 The
Florida court, two justices dissenting, answered in the affirmative.5 Green
v. American Tobacco Co., 154 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1963).1
In other actions against tobacco manufacturers for cancer, none has
resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff, and only one has raised the issue of
foreseeability which was determinative of the present case. In that case,
1 Suit was instituted by the decedent, but upon his death the action survived
under the terms of the Florida Survival Statute, FLA. STAT. § 45.11 (1959), and his
son was substituted as the plaintiff. Decedent's widow later sued under the Florida
Wrongful Death Act, FLA. STAT. § 768.01 (1959), and the two actions were con-
solidated. The trial court directed a verdict for the defendant on the issues of
breach of express warranty, misrepresentation, battery, and violation of the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 52 Stat 1040 (1938), as amended, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-92
(1958), Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat 717 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
8H 41-77 (1958), and the Florida Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, FLA. STAT. § 500.01
(1959). The issues of negligence and breach of implied warranty were submitted
to the jury. The only theory raised on appeal was that of implied warranty.
2 The fourth interrogatory submitted to the jury under FED. R. Cwy. P. 49(b)
was as follows: "Could the defendant on, or prior to, February 1, 1956, by the
reasonable application of human skill and foresight have known that users of Lucky
Strike cigarettes, such as the decedent Green would be endangered, by the inhalation
of the main stream smoke from Lucky Strike cigarettes, of contracting cancer of
the lung?" The jury answered, "No."
3 Green v. American Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962).
4 Does the law of Florida impose on a manufacturer and distributor of
cigarettes absolute liability, as for breach of implied warranty, for death
caused by using such cigarettes from 1924 or 1925 until February 1, 1956,
the cancer having developed prior to February 1, 1956, and the death occur-
ring February 25, 1958, when the defendant manufacturer and distributor
could not on, or prior to, February 1, 1956, by the reasonable application of
human skill and foresight, have known that users of such cigarettes would
be endangered, by the inhalation of the main stream smoke from such
cigarettes, of contracting cancer of the lung?
Instant case at 170.
5 In both the trial court and in the opinion of the Florida Supreme Court there
was some confusion as to the degree of foreseeability to which the manufacturer
would be held. The trial judge did not invariably use the word "reasonable" in his
instructions: "such implied warranty does not cover substances in the manufactured
product, the harmful effects of which no developed human skill or foresight can
afford knowledge." Green v. American Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d 70, 77 (5th Cir.
1962). (Emphasis added.) The Supreme Court of Florida also went beyond the
terms of the certified question, note 4 supra, to say that even if discovery of the
defect was impossible liability should be imposed. Instant case at 171.
6After the present case was returned to the Fifth Circuit, that court inexplicably
remanded for a new trial. Green v. American Tobacco Co., No. 19003, 5th Cir.,
Dec. 11, 1963. Holding that both parties were bound by the jury's answers to the
interrogatories that the plaintiff's lung cancer was caused by defendant's cigarettes,
the court said that the issue whether the cigarettes were "reasonably fit and whole-
some" still remained because "the jury has not made any sufficient finding on" that
question. Id. at 9. However, the court also found that the jury "could have rea-
19641
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Lartigue v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,7 the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit, following Louisiana law, approved a jury instruction that
the manufacturer was liable only for harmful effects which it could
foresee.8
The appeal in the present case was based on the implied warranty
theory of products liability, which is codified in the Uniform Sales Act
and the Uniform Commercial Code.9 Closely related is the theory of strict
tort liability for injuries to consumers,'0 which about half the states have
adopted as to food products and which is being increasingly applied to
other products as well." In all the cases decided under these theories of
sonably inferred [from the evidence] that the cigarettes were not 'reasonably fit and
wholesome,"' so that the defendant could not get a directed verdict on that issue.
Id. at 8. Judge Cameron vigorously dissented, and would have remanded only for
trial on the issue of damages, saying that the reasonable fitness issue was foreclosed
by the jury's findings and the Florida Supreme Court's opinion.
7317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 84 Sup. Ct. 137 (1963).
8 317 F.2d at 23. In the only other case to reach a jury, a verdict was directed
for the defendant, but was reversed on appeal on the ground that there was sufficient
evidence from which a reasonable jury could find negligence or breach of warranty.
Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961). On retrial
the jury found that the plaintiff had assumed the risk. Comment, 63 CoLum. L. REv.
515, 532 n.84 (1963).
Other cases have dealt only with pretrial questions not raising the substantive
liability issue. R J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Hudson, 314 F.2d 776 (5th Cir.
1963) (no subsequent litigation reported); Padovani v. Bruchhausen, 293 F.2d 546
(2d Cir. 1961) (same); Mitchell v. American Tobacco Co., 183 F. Supp. 406 (M.D.
Pa. 1960), motion to strike impertinent matter from complaint granted, 28 F.R.D.
315 (M.D. Pa. 1961) (same); Ross v. Philip Morris Co., 164 F. Supp. 683 (W.D.
Mo. 1958), modified, Civil No. 9494, W.D. Mo., Oct. 22, 1959 (same); Cooper v.
R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 158 F. Supp. 22 (D. Mass. 1957), aff'd, 256 F.2d
464 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 875 (1958) (defendant granted summary judg-
ment; evidence failed to show it made alleged representations).
9 1 UNIFORM LAws ANN. § 15 (1950); UNIFORM COMMERCAI. CODE § 2-318
(1958). Florida has not adopted the Uniform Sales Act or the Uniform Com-
mercial Code but the theories embodied therein have been judicially adopted. See,
e.g., Smith v. Burdine's, Inc., 144 Fla. 500, 198 So. 223 (1940); Carter v. Hector
Supply Co., 128 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 1961) (dictum).
10 See generally Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the
Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960).
"1 See, e.g., Graham v. Bottenfield's, Inc., 176 Kan. 68, 269 P.2d 413 (1954)
(hair dye); Markovich v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 106 Ohio App. 265, 149 N.E2d
181 (1958) (permanent wave solution). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND),
TORTS § 402A (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1962). The actions for strict liability and implied
warranty do not supplant the action for negligence. They do, however, make it
unnecessary to show negligence.
Although normally the cause of the defect can be traced directly to the manu-
facturer, the retailer and the wholesaler are usually liable as well. Since the im-
plied warranty action began as a contract action, originally the consumer could only
sue the retailer with whom he was in privity. As the courts began to withdraw
the need for privity, the implied warranty action became more and more like an
action in tort. For this reason some states now deny recovery against the retailer
or wholesaler in the tort action, apparently reasoning that since the manufacturer will
eventually be liable when he is sued for indemnification by the retailer or whole-
saler he might as well be liable in the first instance. See, e.g., Kroger Grocery Co.
v. Lewelling, 165 Miss. 71, 145 So. 726 (1933) (denying recovery against retailer);
Bowman Biscuit Co. v. Hines, 151 Tex. 370, 251 S.W.2d 153 (1952) (denying
recovery against wholesaler). See generally RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TORTS,
§ 402A, comment f (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1962); Prosser, supra note 10, at 1140-42.
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liability, however, the defendant was able to anticipate the defects and
resulting injuries.'2
For example, consumer injury has often been caused by a foreign
object or deterioration in the product.' 3 Liability is imposed even when it
is not economically feasible for the manufacturer to avoid the defect or the
only known method of avoiding it would make the product unmarketable.
14
In such cases the risk that dangerous defects will occur can be known by
the manufacturer from past experience. In other cases injury was caused
by a latent structural defect resulting from an error in the manufacturing
process or faulty workmanship.15 Again, it may not be economically
feasible for the manufacturer to detect and remove all such defects, but it
can foresee occasional injury. Sometimes the plaintiff is a member of a
limited group of allergic consumers. In such cases the courts have allowed
recovery only when the group is of a sufficient size so that the harm seems
properly attributable to a defect in the product rather than the customer's
abnormality.' 6 Courts have thus required that products be merchantable
to most, but not all, varieties of consumers. Although the courts do not
explicitly base their decisions on whether the defendant could foresee
injury to a sizeable group, the results seem to reflect a concern with
foreseeability.
The jury's conclusion in the present case that the manufacturer did
not know before 1956 that cigarette smoking created a risk of lung cancer
seems surprising, because there is a substantial body of literature published
before 1956 dealing with the relationship between smoking and lung
12 But cf. Gottsdanker v. Cutter Labs., 182 Cal. App. 2d 602, 6 Cal. Rep. 320
(Dist. Ct. App. 1960), in which liability was imposed against the manufacturer of a
polio vaccine although the jury found that the manufacturer could not have known
that the vaccine would cause polio. See generally Comment, 63 CoLum. L. REv. 515
(1963). However, the defect was not generic to the product as in the case of
tobacco. Thus, the manufacturer should have been prepared for a limited amount of
harm caused by occasional vaccine that was predictably imperfect.
'3 E.g., Blanton v. Cudahy Packing Co., 154 Fla. 872, 19 So. 2d 313 (1944)
(deleterious, unhealthy, or poisonous substance in can of meat product); Davis v.
Van Camp Packing Co., 189 Iowa 775, 176 N.W. 382 (1920) (unwholesome pork
and beans causing ptomaine poisoning); Ward v. Morehead City Sea Food Co.,
171 N.C. 33, 87 S.E. 958 (1916) (deleterious fish); Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino,
27 Ohio App. 475, 161 N.E. 557 (1928) (needle found in a cake). See generally
Comment, 63 CoLum L. REv. 515, 526 (1963).
14 A seller of fresh pork might not be able to remove the danger that trichinae
may be present without cooking or freezing the pork, thereby depriving it of its
freshness. However, some courts hold him liable to a consumer who contracts
trichinosis under an implied warranty or strict liability theory even though he acted
reasonably. E.g., Rinaldi v. Mohican Co., 225 N.Y. 70, 121 N.E. 471 (1918); cf.
Kenower v. Hotels Statler Co., 124 F.2d 658 (6th Cir. 1942) (typhoid clams).
The fact that the danger of trichinosis is so well known today might make appro-
priate the defense of assumption of the risk against a plaintiff who had not properly
cooked the pork. See Nicketta v. National Tea Co., 338 Ill. App. 159, 87 N.E2d
30 (1949), in which the court took judicial notice that pork was not dangerous if
properly cooked, and thus denied recovery to the plaintiff.
15 See Plant, Strict Liability of Manufacturers for Injuries Caused by Defects in
Products-An Opposing View, 24 TENN. L. REv. 938-39 (1957).
16 E.g., Crotty v. Shartenberg's-New Haven, Inc., 147 Conn. 460, 162 A.2d
513 (1960); Bianchi v. Denholm & McKay Co., 302 Mass. 469, 19 N.E.2d 697
(1939).
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cancer.17 Moreover, it has long been common knowledge that smoking
may have some deleterious effects on health, even if the causal connection
with the specific illness of lung cancer was in doubt.' 8 These considerations
strongly suggest that in future cases, tobacco manufacturers may rely upon
assumption of the risk as a defense.19 Since it may be tactically inadvisable
for a manufacturer simultaneously to allege that it could not have foreseen
injury resulting from smoking and suggest that the customer had assumed
the risk of such harm, the manufacturer in the present case apparently
elected to rely upon the absence of foreseeability as its defense.
20
The propriety of the present court's rejection of the defense depends
upon the policies behind strict products liability. The doctrine is not based
on fault concepts that underlie liability for negligence. 21 One objective
of the strict products liability doctrine may be to force manufacturers to
raise their standards and reduce the marketing of defective products.2
The threat of financial liability, even though the manufacturer is without
fault, may encourage research to discover new methods of eliminating
harmful defects and weaknesses. Moreover, it may encourage manu-
facturers of new products to engage in additional research that might
uncover harmful effects that are totally unexpected. However, it will
have little effect on manufacturers of products which have been on the
market for some time without any apparent adverse effects.
An equally important rationale behind strict products liability is
attainment of a proper distribution of the financial loss,2 although the
17 See, e.g., Comment, 63 CoLUm. L. REv. 515, 516 n.4 (1963) (survey of
articles in the New York Times from 1946 to 1954 dealing with the connection be-
tween smoking and lung cancer). See generally Brumfield, Liabilities of Tobacco
Industry: Cancer and Its Relationship to Smoking-Is It Actionable, in Ba.LLr, TRIAL
AND TORT TRENDS 1 (1959). The relationship has been confirmed and further
publicized by the recent report of the Surgeon General. N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1964,
§ 1, p. 1, col. 1.
18 See generally Brumfield, supra note 17.
19 It is apparently available in both implied warranty and strict liability actions.
See Prosser, supra note 10, at 1147-48; cf. Hosmer v. Carney, 228 N.Y. 73, 126
N.E. 650 (1920); Brown v. Barber, 26 Tenn. App. 534, 174 S.W.2d 298 (1943).
One difficulty with this defense, however, is that the addictive quality of tobacco
may prevent some consumers from abandoning it even after they know of the risk.
The element of voluntariness traditionally required for this defense, see PROSSER,
TORTS 311-13 (2d ed. 1955), may thus be absent The tobacco companies might,
of course, counter that when the consumer commenced smoking he did so knowing
the practice was habit-forming.2 0 Under FED. R. Civ. P. 8(e) (2) the defendant could have raised both defenses
in the alternative. In addition to the tactical disadvantages, cigarette companies may
be hesitant to raise the defense of assumption of the risk because of the effect such
a pleading might have upon sales. But see Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco
Co., Civil No. 12820, W.D. Pa., Nov. 9, 1962, in which the jury found that the
plaintiff had assumed the risk.2 1lAlthough fault concepts may underlie much of products liability law, all of
the cases cannot be explained on that basis. See, e.g., cases cited note 14 supra.
22 See, e.g., Llewellyn, On Warranty. of Quality, and Society: II, 37 COLUM.
L. REv. 341, 407-08 (1937).
23 See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling- Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944)
(Traynor, J., concurring) ; James, General Products-Should Manufacturer Be
Liable Without Negligence?, 24 TENN'. L. REv. 923 (1957); Pound, The Problem
of'the Exploding Bottle, 40 B.U.L. Ray. 167; 185-86 (1960).
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courts rarely refer to this theory.24 The manufacturer is usually in a
better position than most injured consumers to bear any loss resulting
from a product defect. Although there is no indication that tobacco
manufacturers have insured against liability for deaths caused by cigarettes,
manufacturers generally can provide for products liability insurance or
self-insurance by raising their prices. If neither consumer nor manu-
facturer has prepared financially for lingering lung cancer, the manufacturer
is often in a better position to borrow at lower interest rates, or to draw
from a reserve account, to finance the loss. On the other hand, it is
difficult for manufacturers to plan for the risk if they cannot foresee the
number and kinds of injuries which may occur.25 This consideration is
especially applicable to the tobacco industry in which the defect is generic
to the product and potential liability could be staggering. Hence, the
risk distribution theory does not easily sustain liability when the scope
of the harm is not foreseeable.
The present court apparently based its decision on the notion that a
manufacturer who offers goods to the public should, in fairness, be
responsible for all injuries caused by his products when properly used by
the consumer.26
There exists, we think, no real alternative and no valid objection
to this distribution of -the burden, if the public health is to be
protected in any practical sense from exploitation by those who,
for a profit motive, undertake to supply the vast and ever increas-
ing variety of products which the people by unprecedented powers
of commercial persuasion are daily urged to use and consume.27
This rationale seems dearly to justify imposition of liability although
the manufacturer could not foresee the loss. This theory would justify
imposition of strict liability, for example, upon manufacturers of thalido-
mide. Although this drug apparently harmed only the unborn, like
tobacco its harm-producing quality was generic,28 and the injuries were
unforeseeable by the manufacturers. The foreseeability problem and the
generic nature of the harm-producing quality of tobacco distinguish the
24 [E]xcept for the casual reference in the lone opinion of Justice Traynor
[see note 23 stpra] . . . no court, so far as can be discovered, ever has so
much as mentioned insurance in a products-liability case. What insurance
can do, of course, is to distribute losses proportionately among a group who
are to bear them. What it cannot and should not do is to determine whether
the group should bear them in the first instance ....
Prosser, stpra note 10, at 1121.
The present court did refer to "this distribution of the burden," but did not
discuss this theory. Instant case at 173.
2 See generally Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law
of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961).
26 See Prosser, supra note 10, at 1122-24.
27 Instant case at 173.
2 See N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1962, p. 39, col. 8. The cholesterol contained in
dairy products, if shown to have caused injury, is another generic type of defect
that could subject the dairy 'industry to significant liabilities for injuries it could
not foresee.
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present case from previous decisions involving implied warranty or strict
tort liability for injuries caused by defective products, but this decision is
a tenable assessment of a manufacturer's duty to his consumer.
RATE REGULATION-FPC PASSES TO CONSUMERS MUCH OF
THE BENEFIT OF ACCELERATED DEPRECIATION
The Natural Gas Act directs the Federal Power Commission to
balance the interests of the investor and consumer by requiring that the
lowest reasonable rates be charged by regulated companies.' The Com-
mission limited petitioner pipe line company to a 1.5 percent rate of return
on its deferred tax reserve fund-that part of its investment accumulated
by using accelerated depreciation-holding that this return would provide
the company "with sufficient incentive to continue to use liberalized de-
preciation" procedures authorized by the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.2
A 6.46 percent 3 rate of return was allowed on -the other components of the
company's rate base.4 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit held that the Commission's decision was consistent with the policy
underlying the accelerated depreciation provisions 5 and that the allowable
rate of return was a matter within the agency's competence. Panhandle
E. Pipe Line Co. v. FPC, 316 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 32
U.S.L. WEEK 3153 (U.S. Oct. 21, 1963).
Section 167 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, with respect to
depreciation, and section 168, with respect to amortization, permit liberal
deductions in the early years of an asset's life to increase available working
capital and encourage investment in plant and equipment.6 In dealing
with the effect of this tax benefit upon the administration of the reasonable
rate provision of the Natural Gas Act, it is necessary to determine whether,
in reality, the benefit is a saving or a deferral. Significantly, Congress
1 "Whenever the Commission . . .shall find that any rate . . . [is] unreasonable
. . . the Commission shall determine the just and reasonable rate . . . . [T]he
Commission may order a decrease where existing rates are . . . not the lowest
reasonable rates." Natural Gas Act § 5(a), 52 Stat. 823 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717d (a)
(1958). This "lowest!' reasonable rate proviso is peculiar to the Natural Gas Act.
See note 24 infra.2 Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co., CCH 1961 UTU.. L. REP. 1 10118 (FPC 1961);
see Northern Natural Gas Co., CCH 1961 UTI.. L. REP. 1 10114 (FPC 1961).
8 6.46% is derived as an average of the different rates allowed on the different
components of the rate base. These components are long-term debt (3.55%), pre-
ferred stock (3.99%), and common equity (10.47%). The deferred tax fund is the
fourth component of the rate base and brings the overall average to 6.25%. Panhandle
E. Pipe Line Co., supra note 2, at 14505.
4 The rate base represents the cost of property invested by the company in render-
ing public service. A company is entitled to a "fair return" on this figure. Hope
Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 134 F.2d 287 (4th Cir. 1943), rev'd on other grounds, 320
U.S. 591 (1944).5 The Commission ruled that the same congressional intent was embodied in both
the liberalized depreciation, INT. Rzv. CODE OF 1954, § 167, and accelerated amortiza-
tion, INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 168, provisions and that they should be accorded the
same treatment. Amere Gas Util. Co., 15 F.P.C. 760, 781-82 (1956).
. 6 S. REP1. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1954); H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1954).
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viewed the sections as providing merely a tax deferral, 7 but it has been
asserted that, in effect, there will be a tax saving so long as a company
maintains a constant or increasing level of capital investment, so that de-
ferrals in future years from accelerated depreciation of new assets will
equal or exceed the increased tax burden in those years from old assets."
However, any number of contingencies-war, depletion, recession, or
repeal of the tax statute 9 -could curtail expansion. It is, therefore, more
reasonable to consider the benefit accruing under sections 167 and 168 as a
tax deferral.10
Consistently with this view, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, in City of Detroit v. FPC,11 upheld the Commission's
action in permitting a regulated company to use the normalization method
of accounting, which reflects in the charges to present ratepayers an
amount for tax expenses which exceeds the actual present outlay. The
Commission properly recognized that a failure to permit this would result
in lower charges to present ratepayers at the expense of future consumers
whose rates would have to be high enough to cover the increased tax
burden resulting from deferral. If the benefit were a tax saving there
would, of course, be no problem of allocation between present and future
ratepayers.U
The court also sustained, in City of Detroit, the Commission's decision
to permit the regulated company to include reserves for deferred taxes in
its rate base. The court explained that, by setting up a special reserve
7 "In addition, the changes with respect to depreciation . . . not only represent
mere shifts in timing, but also are designed to stimulate the economy and broaden
the tax base." 100 CONG. REc. 3421 (1954) (remarks of Congressman Reed, Chair-
man of House Ways and Means Committee).
"Faster depreciation, it should be noted, will merely shift the tax deductions
from later to earlier years. It will not increase total deductions." President's Budget
Message, 1 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 1567 (1954).
8 Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 173 Ohio St. 473, 184
N.E.2d 84 (1962) (per curiam); Pittsburgh v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n,
182 Pa. Super. 551, 575-76, 128 A.2d 372, 383-84 (1956); Re Tax Treatment of
Accelerated Depreciation, 33 P.U.R.3d 209 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1960); Bangor
Hydro-Elec. Co., 26 P.U.R.3d 489 (Me. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1958); Re Pub. Serv. Co.
of N.H., 18 P.U.R.3d 523 (N.H. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1957).
An additional way to convert accelerated depreciation into a tax saving, prior
to the enactment of INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1245, was by sale of equipment during
the early years of depreciation. Now § 1245 provides that gains from the sale of
assets that were depreciated under accelerated procedures are to be treated as ordinary
income rather than as capital gain.
9 City of Alton v. Commerce Comm'n, 19 Ill. 2d 76, 90-01, 165 N.E.2d 513, 521-22
(1960).
Another factor may be decrease in demand, but there is disagreement as to
whether the demand for power is elastic. Hearings on H.R. 10650 Before Senate
Committee on Finance, 87th Cong., 2d Sess 1010-11 (1962).
1oCity of Alton v. Commerce Comm'n, supra note 9; BoNBE iGT, PRINcIPLES
OF PUBLIc UTInrry RATES 221-22 (1961). See generally Swiren, Accelerated Depre-
ciation Tax Benefits in Utility Rate Making, 28 U. CHI. L. REv. 629 (1960-61).
11230 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 829 (1956).
12 Under the normalization method of accounting, consumer rates are calculated
as if the normal tax burden had been paid. The difference between taxes actually
paid and that which is recorded as paid for rate purposes is placed in a reserve fund
to pay the heavier future burden. Under the flow-through method of accounting,
consumer rates are set on the basis of the tax that was actually paid. No measures
need be taken to protect the future ratepayer, since there is no heavier future burden.
1964]
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account consisting of accruals for taxes in excess of those actually paid, the
Commission insured that those funds would be used to meet the increased
taxes that were deferred and would not be paid out in dividends. 13 How-
ever, the question of the rate of return allowable on the reserve account
was not decided until Northern Natural Gas Co.'4 and the present case, the
first rate proceedings actually involving the question.
The Natural Gas Act envisages the setting of consumer rates at a
level sufficient to provide the regulated company with a reasonable profit
on the funds it has invested.15 It is the task of the Commission to deter-
mine the proper allocation of the benefit of accelerated depreciation between
the regulated company and its ratepayers. The Commission originally
indicated that regulated companies were to get the full benefit of accelerated
depreciation. 16 On this principle, the rate of return applied to the reserve
fund would be the average of the returns allowed on the other components
of the rate base.17  However, according to the decisions in Northern
Natural Gas Co. and the present case, the Commission has limited the
return on the reserve fund to that rate necessary to provide an incentive
for the continued use of accelerated depreciation.' 8 Thus, it allowed a
lower rate of return on these funds than on other capital and passed on
to the consumer a substantial portion of the benefits of accelerated deprecia-
tion. This general approach seems proper, especially since the reserve
fund made available through the tax deferral does not represent risk
capital.
In deciding that a return of 1.5 percent on the reserve fund would
effectuate the objectives of sections 167 and 168, the Commission was
guided by the rate then applicable for conventional debt financing. Since
the utility would have had to pay 4.5 to 5 percent interest in order to
borrow funds on the market, and the guaranteed rate of return to the
utility on debt-financed investment was 6.25 percent, the utility would
make 1.25 to 1.75 percent from this type of financing. Hence, the Com-
mission reasoned that to allow less than a 1.5 percent return on the deferred
tax fund would mean that there might be no more incentive to expand
than there was prior to the enactment of the accelerated depreciation
provisions.' 9 The Commission decided that a rate of return no greater than
13 City of Detroit v. FPC, 230 F.2d 810, 821 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 352
U.S. 829 (1956).
14 CCH 1961 UTm. L. REP. 10114 (FPC 1961).
15 See note 5 supra.
16E Paso Natural Gas Co., 22 F.P.C. 260 (1959) (dictum), rev'd on other
grounds, 281 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 912 (1961); Phillip's
Petroleum Co., 24 F.P.C. 537 (1960) (dictum); Amere Gas Util. Co., 15 F.P.C. 760,
782 (1956) (dictum); Opinion No. 264, Treatment of Federal Income Taxes as
Affected by Accelerated Amortization, 12 F.P.C. 369 (1953).
17 Market conditions provide a guide to the rate of return on all the other com-
ponents of the rate base; there is no comparable guide for the deferred tax fund.
18 Instant case at 663. Since the rate of return for the company is lower, less
need be paid in by the consumer, which means that the benefits are passed on to the
consumer in the form of lower rates.
19 Northern Natural Gas Co., CCH 1961 UTI. L. REP. 10114 (FPC 1961), on
which the Commission in the instant case relied. Panhandle E.'Pipe Line Co., CCH
1961 UT L. L. REP. 10118 (FPC 1961).-
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that applicable to conventional debt financing would be sufficient to induce
the utility to adopt accelerated depreciation because of the advantages
inherent in this method of financing:
The substantial sums involved are readily available without
resort to the market, and such additions to capital serve to reduce
the company's debt ratio. The acquisition of plant by use of
deferred taxes provides additional security not subject to lien on
which new loans can be based, perhaps at lower interest rates than
would otherwise be possible. Furthermore, deferred tax funds
accumulated between rate cases and invested in plant may, during
that period, increase the company's earnings. Finally, the ac-
cumulation of deferred taxes increases the company's funds
available for expansion without issuing additional common stock. 0
Assuming that the 1.5 percent allowance represents the minimum
amount which could be permitted with expectation of investment, the Com-
mission may not have sufficiently considered the impact of its sharp change
in policy in Northern Natural Gas Co. and the present case upon a
company considering election of the accelerated depreciation method.21
Development plans encompass many future years, and the rate of return
allowed on the deferred tax reserve fund may be an essential element in
the financing of these plans. An apparent readiness on the part of the
Commission to change policy, coupled with the contention in its brief that
it has power to give no rate of return on this fund,22 could cause a
company to hesitate to formulate investment plans that are dependent on
the rate of return presently allowed on the deferred tax reserve fund. The
added expense and inconvenience in maintaining two sets of books and in
litigating the question of the proper return on the deferred fund are also
proper considerations.P
With the present statutory framework, the accommodation in the
present case seems correct. Since a reasonable rate requirement is com-
mon to the enabling statutes of several federal regulatory commissions, 24 a
similar treatment of accelerated depreciation is likely. Therefore, with
20 Northern Natural Gas Co., supra note 19, at 14486.
21 The opinion gives no attention to this.
22 Respondent's Petition for Rehearing En Banc, pp. 4-5.
23 Welch, Utility Accounting and Investment Tax Credit, ABA SECTION o PUB-
LIC UTILrrY LAW, REPORT 52, 53-54 (1963).
24 See, e.g., Communications Act § 201(b), 48 Stat. 1070 (1938), 47 U.S.C.
§201(b) (1958); Interstate Commerce Act, 54 Stat. 911 (1940), 49 U.S.C. § 15(1)
(1958); Federal Aviation Act § 1002(d), 72 Stat. 789 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1482(d)
(1958).
Although the Natural Gas Act gives the Commission discretion to decrease rates
if they are not the "lowest" reasonable rates, see note 1 supra, and thus emphasizes
the Commission's obligation to minimize the return on the reserve fund, the opinions
of the Commission in Northern Natural Gas Co., CCH 1961 UTIL. L. REP. f 10114
(FPC 1961), and in Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co., CCH 1961 UTnL. L. REP. f 10118
(FPC 1961), give no indication that it would have acted differently if it were only
required to fix reasonable rates.
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depreciation rendered only slightly more advantageous than conventional
debt financing, the investment incentive of sections 167 and 168 will be
greatly reduced throughout a large sector of the economy.
In addition to sections 167 and 168, the investment tax credit sections
of the Internal Revenue Code 25 were also enacted to encourage expansion
and modernization of facilities.2 6 They provide that a certain percentage
of the value of qualified investment assets will be credited against income
tax. The general provision is for a credit of 7 percent of the qualified
investment; 2 7 in the case of public utility property, the credit is 3 per-
cent 2 8  Recently, the Federal Communications Commission decided that
the benefits from the tax credit must be reflected on the carrier's accounts
as income realized in the year taken. 29 Although this was technically an
accounting proceeding, its theory will probably be carried through to rate
proceedings.30  The effect of this will be to pass on to the consumer the
full benefit of the tax credit, ignoring the investment incentive policy. 1
Congress has taken steps in response to agency treatment of this provision;
the tax legislation which has been passed by the House of Representatives
includes specific guidelines to regulatory agencies for the disposition of
the benefits of the tax credit 3 2 In the case of the 3 percent credit for
public utility property, the agencies, in establishing the utility's cost of
service, would be prohibited from treating more than a proportional part
of the investment credit-to be determined with reference to the useful life
of the property-as reducing the utility's tax liability.3 3  In the atsence
of similar legislation, the conflict between the rate regulation statutes and
the tax provisions necessitate a compromise solution such as that of the
present case.
34
25 INT. Rv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 38, 46.
26 H.R. REP. No. 2508, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1962).
2 7 INT. Rzv. CODE OF 1954, §46(a) (1).
2
8 INT. RE.v. CODE OF 1954, § 46(c) (3) (A).
2 9 In the Matter of Amendment of Parts 31 & 35 of the Comm'n's Rules, No.
14850, FPC, July 31, 1963.
30 It is clear that the House Committee on Ways and Means believed this to be
the case. H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 36-37 (1963).
31 H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 36-37 (1963). Since this is a tax
saving, there is no need to worry about shifting a heavier burden on future ratepayers.
See note 12 supra and accompanying text. But the incentive objective must be con-
sidered whether the tax benefit is a saving or a deferral.
32 H.R. 8363, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. § 202(e) (1963); H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
33 H.R. 8363, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. § 202(e) (1) (1963) ; H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1963).
34 As to whether public utilities need investment incentive, or should be expressly
excluded from the operation of such tax saving or deferral provisions, see The Gas
Pipeline: A New Set of Rules?, Forbes, Sept. 1, 1963, pp. 20-23.
